

Board (not just its changing composition),¹¹ as well as concern about whether the Board will continue to take a leading role in safeguards issues.¹²

A chemical weapons verification agency could be spared some of the adaptation problems of the IAEA, but would have to operate in an environment similar to that now faced by the Agency. Whether or not it would face some of the attendant constraints depends to a great extent on the character and strength of the specific political environment, and on the ability of a chemical weapons convention to generate and maintain a strong consensus. Such a convention would have to be drawn up in a more complex environment, both technically and politically, than that of the Agency's Statute (or even the NPT), and thus might be more constrained. The development of blocs within the IAEA (there have been Eastern and Western blocs, but the Group of 77 is now important) would possibly be replicated within a chemical weapons verification agency, particularly if chemical industry transfers were significantly affected by it.

Notes

1. IAEA, *Annual Report for 1985*, GC(XXX)/775, pp. 60, 71.
2. L. Scheinman, *The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order*, (Washington: Resources for the Future, 1987), pp. 166-167, quoted p. 167.
3. H. Grumm, "IAEA Safeguards: Status and Prospects," in IAEA, *Nuclear Safeguards Technology, 1982, Vol. 1*, (Vienna: IAEA, 1983), p. 9.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
5. Scheinman, p. 233.
6. In two cases, however (one being Pakistan's KANUPP reactor), the Agency was for a time unable to verify compliance. See D. A. V. Fischer and P. Szasz, *Safeguarding the Atom: A Critical Appraisal*, (London: Taylor and Francis, 1985), pp. 16-17.
7. Benjamin N. Schiff, *International Nuclear Technology Transfer: Dilemmas of Dissemination and Control*, (Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1983), pp. 142-143.
8. Fischer and Szasz, p. 94.
9. E.g., M. F. Imber, "Arms Control Verification: The Special Case of IAEA-NPT 'Special Inspections,'" *Arms Control*, Vol. 3 (December 1982), p. 69.
10. Whether or not an issue is "politicized" in the sense of becoming subject to "extraneous" concerns depends on one's definition of the issue. Thus, complaints of politicization could reflect as much loss of control over the agenda as anything else. In another sense of "politicized" – being concerned with political issues – the IAEA has always been political.
11. Scheinman argues, for example, that the Board was long dominated by personnel from the "atomic energy community," but these have now largely been replaced by "a new generation which in many states are drawn from the ranks of those who reflect the kind of thinking that now dominates the United Nations General Assembly and whose principal concerns are voting majorities, national secretariat quotas and technical assistance." United States, Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on International Security and Scientific Affairs and on International Economic Policy and Trade, *The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): Improving Safeguards*, 97th Cong., 2nd Session, 1982, p. 58.
12. Fischer and Szasz, pp. 95-97.