

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

in full measure to the verification of the elimination of stocks of chemical weapons. But this approach in no way calls for extremes -- the converting of verification into an end in itself.

What kind of approach to the verification of the destruction of stocks would we consider effective and at the same time sufficient and consequently the most feasible? As you know, the Soviet Union proposes the conduct of verification through systematic international inspections on the basis of an agreed quota at the facility (facilities) for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles.

The level of the quota, which in our view means an agreed number of international inspections per year at one destruction facility or another, could be determined by the consultative committee on the basis of criteria agreed on in advance.

Unfortunately, the rigid position of one delegation on the question of the verification of the destruction of stocks, which up to now has not wished to take into account anything except its own maximalist proposals, has hampered the solution of this problem. We appeal to it in the hope that it will be able to make an objective assessment of the proposals of other delegations too, primarily from the point of view of providing an assurance of the compliance of States parties possessing chemical weapons with the order for the destruction of their stocks which has been elaborated and agreed on.

Is it not clear, for example, that there is no need at all for the permanent presence of inspectors at a facility destroying, for instance, small lots of chemical weapon stocks that are, furthermore, obsolete or of low toxicity, during the entire process of destruction? The stock probably does not represent any significant danger from a military point of view, but rather creates problems for the State to which it belongs, because the time for its storage has expired and it presents a danger for the environment, but under the convention the same close attention would be paid to it as to the latest and most dangerous chemicals.

The Soviet Union proposes a differentiated approach whereby, for the purposes of verification, account would be taken of the quantity of the stocks to be destroyed at one facility or another, their characteristics according to toxicity and danger, the destructive capacity of the facilities, the level of their automation and some other factors. In practice this would mean that in some cases the inspectors of the consultative committee would visit the facility more frequently, and in others less frequently. Nerve gases are one thing and chloropycine quite another.