

even the experts were caught by surprise with the tremendous pace of the debacle, once it started taking place; the Warsaw Pact has for practical purposes ceased to exist. We are now witnessing events in the Soviet Union that lead one to wonder really whether the federation will survive itself.


I think the United States is weary now of its role as a guardian of the security of the West. It is certainly tired of the expenses that go with it. And one wonders whether that strong view which has always prevailed in the United States which has been an inward looking one, will be a great deal more influential in the years ahead. That leaves us wondering really what this means in terms of affiliations and consequences for Canada. I do share your pessimism.

David Cox: For ten years now I have been mainly concerned with arms control and security. And the arms control debate essentially had the objective of finding non-catastrophic solutions to the situation that we are in – which is largely caused by the development and proliferation of nuclear arms. From an arms control point of view then the situation is better, not worse, but I think that psychologically, arms control is now a problem. Instead of dealing with the relatively clean dilemma and policy issue – how to walk away from nuclear weapons – we now suddenly find that we have to deal with this complex of issues which have been raised around the table.

And so what to do? My tentative answer is, you have to have another go at what has been tried before, which is to put down institutional procedural controls and try again – as the League did and as the United Nations did – to control non-catastrophic but potentially horrendous conflicts. From a Canadian point of view it seems to offer some opportunities, but also a lot of grey area in which we are probably incapable of having much effect.

Stein: A common theme in what we all said was the identification of change which creates instability, which creates unpredictability. Why do we think of those in negative terms? I don't. If we look back at what was – I think the structures that existed for the last forty years were fraught with danger. Through a whole series of fortuitous processes, we avoided those dangers. And the changes that we are seeing now, move us away from many of the greatest flash points for the security system as a whole. Very bluntly, the question is for Canada: what can we do to reinforce the changes that serve our interests, in the sense that they create a far less threatening environment than the environment that we have had over the last forty years.

Stairs: In response to Janice's comment: why were we more comfortable with the familiar terror? I think the answer to that is quite straightforward, at least for Canadians. The terror with which we were familiar, was in fact a stable one that had rules that somehow we all understood. And frankly the rules were sufficiently stable, that I, for one, was really never concerned about it actually breaking down at any stage. What has happened now is that we have changed all those rules, and we don't know what the new rules are. And we have danced around one obvious question, and that is the German problem.



*It is a long time since
we've had any real
influence.... And if
anyone has had illusions
about it, it has been
Canadians, no one else.*

Cox: What is the German problem in 1991?

Stairs: It is the traditional German problem – it is an enormous agglomeration of power which, in spite of all it has said, is going to be, or could be, fuelled by a resurgent German nationalism. Now the question is whether that will find expression in dangerous forms. I am a little nervous about it, and if I were a Pole, I would be very nervous about it.

Stein: Before we get to the German problem, I want to challenge the proposition Denis put. A lot of the recent research that has been done as new information has become available from the Soviet side, challenges that proposition and suggests that the rules of the game were unclear at several flash points. We came dangerously close several times in the post-war period. I have very little confidence in the sanity and soundness of the judgements of

people who were forced to work under those rules of the game. I have no nostalgia whatsoever for the predictability imposed by those rules.

I outlined danger to areas outside the central core, which I see as very real and very threatening, especially the nuclearization of the Middle East. That process has been going on irrespective of the change in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. In Iraq, in Libya, in Israel, the processes predate these changes. And the interesting question is, can we manage them better if we have an improved relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Thériault: It seems quite conceivable to me that the very phrase "East-West relationship," in fifteen to twenty years will just not be an expression that will be relevant any longer to the situation. The hostility in the East-West relationship is attenuating very rapidly. Gorbachev very clearly is determined to fundamentally rearrange the relationship in order that he may count on Western credits, Western technology, in order to help bring about the enormous economic restructuring that is required in the Soviet Union.

However, to go on from that situation which indeed holds a great deal of promise, to suggesting that the Soviet Union should now become the focus of major investment abroad, on the part of the Western countries, is a very significant proposition. There is a very substantial burden of responsibility on the Soviets to build down an *awful* lot farther. The Americans are going to want to see some very significant change on the part of the Soviet Union, in terms of the power relationship and the building down of military forces, so that they very clearly would not again be threatening.

Stairs: I think that it is highly unlikely that the deep freeze kind of Cold War is going to return, whether or not the changes within the Soviet Union are permanent. On the other hand, the question of Europe is a very different matter because what we are seeing – whether under a German hegemony or under some kind of communal set of arrangements that really work – is a massive colossus coming out of Europe. We really are undergoing another kind of shift in the global balance of power which will create new stresses.

All of this buttresses rather traditional premises of Canadian foreign policy, which have a lot to do with encouraging institutionalization of interstate relations. I would argue that nothing is happening in the international environment that should change that general, strategic premise. ▽