

in honor of the Lieut. Governor's approach, the guns (the two splendid new 9-pounder rifle guns which were only issued out of store last fall) were found to be "not in a serviceable condition," and therefore the usual, and some people say, *necessary salute* was not fired, and the guns had to be "limbered up" and taken home. It is said that when the order to "load" was given, the guns were found to be stopped up, that hot water was procured, the sponge wet and rammed home, where it froze fast, and that the sponge handle was broken in attempting to withdraw it. If this is true, and I have every reason to believe it is, it is really too bad that guns of any kind, let alone such beautiful and effective pieces of field artillery as these, should be so kept that such an accident as the foregoing, should be a possibility. And people here who have had in times past something to do with artillery both in camp and in armoury are asking where were their aprons and their tompons, and how and where have the guns been kept. Were they in "gun sheds" duly locked and secured and subject to frequent inspection, or were they packed under the eye and constant view of the guard? And surely this last would not be too much to expect even if they are exposed to all the changes of the weather in this place of extremes in temperature. I write at full on this unpleasant subject because of the sneers which have been flung indiscriminately at the whole Volunteer Force of the Province, and in order if possible, to hinder a repetition of such an occurrence, and thus save the Force from being charged with inefficiency and neglect of duty. I see that questions are being asked in our local papers in regard to this matter, and if the authorities should answer in any way I will let you know.

We are now (as people say) paying up for the mild weather which we had in the early part of the season—our thermometers going as low as 43 below zero.

There is as yet no signs of a change in the way of dealing with the Provincial Militia, the same neglect &c., &c., which has prevailed for the last four years still prevails and has almost killed the "military spirit" here. Why this difference between our treatment and that of British Columbia?

I remain,

E. J. O.

Winnipeg, 7th February, 1876.

We have no doubt when this comes under the notice of the Major General commanding that proper enquiry will be instituted in regard to this matter.—Ed. Vol. Rev.

We are glad that the General Commanding our Canadian Army, has deemed it advisable to issue a general order regarding dress regulations—wearing of badges &c., &c., as there has been such a diversity of opinion existing amongst officers of the Force in

regard to it. We regret that it is out of our power to publish it in this number of the Review, owing to its length and the late hour it reached us, it will however appear in our next.

Russia and Turkey.

The following exposition of the views of Russia with regard to Turkey, which is given by a Constantinople correspondent, is interesting at the present time. He writes:—

"Whatever might be the drift of Russian policy in former ages, the Russians say it is inconceivable that sound-minded politicians should take no account of altered circumstances, and should not see that, if the aggrandisement of their Empire at the expense of Turkey was ever contemplated by their rulers, such a scheme has now necessarily and irrevocably been abandoned. Turkey may have been to Russia what Cuba was to the United States of America. So long as the American Union was a slave holding community, Cuba, as the only slave market, would have been, to the Washington Cabinet, a priceless acquisition: but since the triumph of the cause of abolitionism at the end of the civil war that island with its half million of slaves would be a burden and a cause of strife to the Americans, who now would never take it were it offered to them as a gift by Spain herself and with the world's consent. Upon the same ground, the Russians reason, the Government of St. Petersburg, whatever may have been its former views, would now for its own sake, shrink from the responsibility of subjecting to its sway twenty millions of subjects of various races, creeds, and language, discordant on every subject except on the one of the antipathy which all of them—Roumans, Greeks, and Slavs—cherish and openly evince towards Russia. Were she bent on crossing the Danube and overrunning the Balkan Peninsula, she would have to reckon on the enmity not only of the Ottomans, but also of those Principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia, Servia, and Montenegro which, 'out of pure Christian and human zeal,' she herself most powerfully contributed to withdraw from the unbearable Mussulman yoke; and she has work enough in hand in her endeavour to achieve the subjugation of wild hordes in Asia, without taking upon herself the government of European tribes, bearing the brunt both of their hostility and of that of their many and powerful sympathisers. That Russia feels cramped and stifled in her inland position, and that she might wish, for some better outlet than the Baltic, and for an access to the Mediterranean through the Bosphorus and the Hellespont, no man could deny, but she feels that the possession of Constantinople and the Straits would involve a necessity for a conquest of the whole of Roumelia and part of Anatolia, compelling her thus to swallow much more than she could digest.

"Moreover, granting even that Russia might have both the wish and the power to occupy Constantinople, when she had achieved so great a conquest, what would she do with it? Would she find the organization and administration of Provinces inhabited by half-civilized and yet corrupt, discordant, and seditious races as easy a task as their subjugation? Could Constantinople and Pera and Galata and the Phanariotes, and the Slavs, and the Armenians, and the rest, be governed from St. Petersburg? Would not Russian colonization become the necessary consequence of a Russian occupation? Or can any sane man imagine that the Emperor

Alexander would follow the example of Constantine, and transfer the seat of the Empire from the Neva to the Bosphorus? Can it be supposed that the Muscovite, who is now awakening to a proud sense of his nationality, would abandon the bracing climate, the hardy yet fertile soil of 'Holy Russia,' wherein lies the compact strength of his colossal state, to expose himself to the enervating influence of southern regions? Would he not answer in the words of Frederick Barbarossa, when the Romans tempted him to exchange the deep flowing Rhine for the creeping waters of the shallow Tiber? The Russian feels that his snow and ice are his proper element, and that Byzantium would offer to the Northern Eagle as unsafe a perch as it proved to the too grasping Roman bird. On the other hand, could Constantinople be reduced to the condition of a provincial town? Or would it be practicable to give the Russian Empire two centres, and make experiment of that dualism which answered so indifferently at Rome, and which is as yet on its trial at Vienna?

"Still, if Russia either does not covet Turkey or looks upon it as 'sour grapes,' what projects does she entertain with respect to the solution of the Eastern Question, and in what sense is she exercising the influence which she doubtless possesses over the Porte, and upon which her adversaries put so sinister a construction? The policy of Russia in Turkey, the Russians say, is twofold. She endeavours to keep the Ottoman Empire together as long as it will hold, and she lays the basis of the new edifice which may at some future time rise on its ruins. In pursuit of the first object she suggests to the Porte such broad measures of reform as may establish a *modus vivendi* suitable to the various races and creeds subject to its sway. With a view to future contingencies she sanctions, if she does not encourage, the development of self-government in those provinces which, like Roumania or Servia, are no longer amenable to Ottoman rule, and whose aspirations to independence can no longer be curbed. Were the period for the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and for the expulsion of the Mussulman from Europe to arrive, Russia's scheme would be, in the opinion of the Russians, to establish a confederacy of states in the Balkan Peninsula, possibly also including the Asiatic Provinces on the Straits and the Propontis, which might have its centre on the Bosphorus, where Stamboul, Galata, and Scutari would be raised to the rank of a free city, or perhaps of three free cities, the whole community being erected with the sanction and placed under the joint protection of all the European Powers.

"There is, in my opinion, not a little that sounds specious and plausible in all this alleged apology and revelation of Russian policy. I do not, however, take upon myself to vouch upon its sincerity, or to judge of its practicability, I limit myself to a plain statement. Only, in reference to the execution of the first and immediate part of the programme, I must state the common belief that the scheme of administrative, judicial, and financial reforms which the Porte will, tomorrow or next day, send in, as a circular, to all the diplomatic representatives of the foreign Powers, has certainly been drawn up by the Grand Vizier, Mahmood Pasha, upon the 'disinterested and benevolent' advice of Russian agents, and that, such as the reforms are, they will in all probability be scouted and scorned, not only by Russophobian Levantines, but also by some Turks of an independent mind and especially by Mithad Pasha, who left the Cabinet because he thought that the