

In the present state of parties, it would be decisive from its moral influence, as the centre and capital of the most populous district, almost exclusively inhabited by French Canadians.

There are two lines of operation against the immediate frontier of Montreal, for an enemy advancing from this "Avenue" of Lake Champlain and the Hudson.

1st. That of the Richelieu River.

2nd. That of the Chateaugay River.

In the line of the Richelieu must be included the two roads on each bank. The river itself is navigable throughout in summer, and passable four months generally on the ice in winter. The road by Napierville and L'Acadie, and that by Hemmingford and Douglasscorner, must be included also in this line, all being nearly parallel, and leading more or less on La Prairie, which is the termination of the railroad from St. John's, and where is situated the wharf for the steamboats plying with Montreal.

2nd. The line of Chateaugay is more circuitous, and does not offer the same advantages as that by the Richelieu.

The water-frontier of Canada commences where the line of 45° strikes the St. Lawrence near St. Regis, and the course of this river from Lake Ontario is nearly throughout controlled by the Americans.

It cannot be depended upon as a communication in time of war.

Another line of operations against Montreal presents itself by a flank movement, upon the supposition that its immediate frontier were protected by strong works, which unfortunately is not the case, is thus pointed out by an officer of high rank in a former administration of the United States. He supposes the army assembled at Ogdensburgh, between which and Plattsburgh there are good communications, used during the last war, and where a railroad is now projected.

Ogdensburgh is an improving place, situated just above the rapids of the St. Lawrence. An army cannot well venture to pass below, on account of these rapids; although batteaux descend them, and stores and materials of every kind might be sent down, protected by an army moving by the left bank.

The reasons given for this mode of acting against Montreal by the above officer are:—

1st. "That the force could be assembled at Ogdensburgh with ease.

2nd. "That a water conveyance is furnished all the way to Montreal.

3rd. "That the British are not fortified on the St. Lawrence side, and have no strong outposts, that must be forced, in order to secure the flanks and rear of those engaged in the main attack.

4th. "By approaching his flank, the British General must change his position, in which case he must do one of four things; either he must occupy the north side, and give up the south,—or he must occupy the south, and give up the north,—or he must confine himself to the island of Montreal, and give up both sides,—or finally, he must occupy both sides and thus expose himself to be beaten in detail."

The Americans propose building a fort at Ogdensburgh, at the narrows of the St. Lawrence, with the object of closing the communications this way, between Montreal and Kingston.

There is a third line of operation against Montreal, diverging also from the Avenue of Champlain and Hudson, by the Erie Canal, from Albany and Troy, which communicates both with Lakes Ontario and Erie. This movement against Montreal would be similar to the last mentioned, but attended with more difficulty. It would better answer as a line of operation against Kingston, or to distract attention from the main attack by the Richelieu. It is not likely that he would repeat his error of attacking by two distinct lines of operations, as in the last war.

As the frontier line of the St. Lawrence cannot be used as a communication in time of war, we must depend upon that by the Ottawa and Rideau.

Our chance of acquiring and retaining the naval ascendancy upon Lake Ontario in war, depends upon the security of Kingston and its harbour.

There is no protection to either at present. Fort Henry, however good in itself as a detached work, is inadequate to this purpose.