

fight, and be prepared to fight, without concern for any consequences except those which it is hoped to inflict upon the enemy. It describes a method of attempting to exclude political and psychological factors from a calculation. In choice of strategy and weapons, no method is more erroneous or disastrous, since the excluded factors have a profound effect upon the political cohesion of a coalition.

If this line of reasoning had been followed by Acheson's successors, the alliance of which the U.S. had been the leader from the outset would not have been subjected to such severe strains and such increasing militarization of its policies. Instead, leadership passed to the Dulles brothers, who ran the State Department and the CIA under Eisenhower. The fracturing of the Communist monolithic structure had already begun with Tito's break from Moscow, but it was not until the Seventies, after its costly defeat in Vietnam, that the U.S. learnt that it could not, as Leonard Mosley puts it, "singlehandedly roll back the Soviet armies in Eastern Europe, restore Chiang Kai-shek to mainland China or keep Ho Chi Minh out of South Vietnam".

Unilateralism, based upon divergent interpretations of the strategy of our adversaries, naturally put increasing strains on the political cohesion of the alliance. Pearson writes in his memoirs: "The difficulty of co-ordinating policy through NATO in defence matters, when decision-making power rested in the hands of one member, was most clearly shown in nuclear matters." In a talk with John Foster Dulles in Paris in December 1954, Pearson urged two things: "First, by continuous consultation keep our policies in alignment, especially if the political situation should deteriorate and, secondly, agree, if possible, on 'alert' procedures so that the military would know what had to be done in an emergency."

Pearson perception

It is interesting that Pearson had already perceived the vital change wrought in Canadian security problems by the advent of nuclear weapons and the increasingly efficient methods of delivery by rockets, missiles, submarines and bombers. He writes in his memoirs:

As I saw it, with the threat of nuclear bombs (and later missiles), defence of the North American Arctic became as much a part of the Alliance's responsibility as the defence of Europe. The Treaty was, after all, more than European and I believed that the North American sector should be considered an integral part of the North Atlantic defence structure. Any continental command should be an alliance responsibility. It seemed to me, for example, that Norwegian contingents should operate in our Arctic just as Canadian forces occasionally took part in exercises in Norway. Canada's contribution to Arctic defence, therefore, should be accepted on the same basis as her contribution to overseas defence.

This was not to be. Instead, as John Gellner put it in a *Globe and Mail* article last June:

At the end of the fifties . . . Canada accepted the strike role for the air component of its NATO forces in central Europe. "Strike" in NATO parlance means attack with nuclear weapons. The idea then propounded at SACEUR headquarters was that a limited war on the continent could be fought with both conventional and

tactical nuclear weapons and, even more preposterous, that the latter could be carried by strike aircraft parked unprotected in time of peace on huge airfields the location of which were well known to the potential enemy. Fortunately, this mission was abandoned in 1972, but not before an unconscionable amount of time and effort and at least \$2 billion were wasted in preparing for it. Yet, independent analysis in 1959 would have shown — as it did to some unofficial analysts who were not listened to — that this mission made as little sense then as it did 13 years later.

Attention remained focused exclusively on Canada's role in the defence of Central Europe, with somewhat indecisive experiments at shifting our attention northwards to support the defence of the NATO northern flank in Norway. Meanwhile, in the Arctic, a variety of defence tasks still awaits our attention. John Gellner points out the need for "Arctic surveillance . . . [and] the asserting of sovereignty in territorial waters and of control over the economic zone that extends 200 miles out to sea". Nonetheless, our NATO role remains focused on the central front in Europe and on keeping open the transatlantic lanes along which troop reinforcements and supplies from Canada would supposedly be transported.

Pearson was the first NATO foreign minister to visit the Soviet Union after the death of Stalin. In his discussions with Khrushchev, at which I was present, his perception of the consequences of nuclear weapons for Canada's security was confirmed. Khrushchev agreed with Pearson that "no one wanted war in the nuclear age" but stressed that, in the event of world war, "the results would be infinitely worse than the last" and that "this time Canada would not be geographically secure".

If these words are to be taken seriously, as I believe they should be, then NATO should stop developing nuclear-weapon systems mainly on the basis of purely military considerations in disregard of the intolerably high risks of nuclear escalation. Considering the profound consequences of lowering the threshold between nuclear and conventional weapons, it is to be hoped that Prime Minister Trudeau's opposition to the neutron bomb will prevail against the military strategists, who are reported as favouring this "valuable addition to the Western European arsenal". He stated that nuclear weapons should be retained as a deterrent — for strategic purposes only.

Suez

From a political standpoint, the disastrous effects of unilateral action by the NATO allies on the cohesion of the alliance was exposed by the Suez crisis. Pearson writes: "By 1956, in fact, I was losing hope that NATO would evolve beyond an alliance for defence; and even there I was beginning to have doubts about its future." These doubts were triggered by the disarray among the principal allies after each took different positions on Nasser's decision to nationalize the Canal. Before the British and the French decided to join Israel in military action against Egypt, Pearson had tried to impress upon the British the desirability of having the whole Suez question considered in the NATO Council. After all, the strategic importance of Suez to NATO's southern flank had always been self-evident. Nasser, moreover, had appealed openly to the Soviet Union for help for the Aswan project after being turned down by the Western allies.