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> POLAND.

April 15, 1943.

CONFIDENTIAL.

SECTION 1.

[C 4130/258/55]

Copy No. 068a

Mr. Bagge to Mr. Eden.—(Received April 15.)

(No. 175.)

Sir,

Kuibyshev, March 13, 1943.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 239 of the 10th March about the new newspaper in Polish, *Wolna Polska* ("Free Poland") or "Organ of the Union of Polish Patriots." I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy<sup>(1)</sup> of the first number of this newspaper, which appeared in Moscow on the 1st March, and a cutting<sup>(1)</sup> from the *Moscow News* of the 10th March describing the contents of the first number on much the same lines as the *Pravda* article of the 8th March, to which I have already drawn attention.

2. A great deal of the *Moscow News* article deals with the question of guerrilla warfare in Poland. This, as is already generally known, is one of the many questions about which the Polish and Soviet Governments do not see eye to eye. The Polish Government are anxious in principle to do all that is possible to harry the German forces and German administration in Polish territory, and are in favour of many of the partisan movements which are now active on the German lines of communication. Some of these have been started by Soviet agents, but others, according to the Polish Embassy, through Polish efforts, though Soviet propaganda likes to ascribe the credit to Soviet inspiration. But the Polish Government at the same time believes that premature action on the part of the population at large on the scale for which Soviet propaganda presses will merely lead to useless massacres. The Soviet Government, on the other hand, are concerned to find immediate relief for the eastern front, and they may genuinely think that mass action could have a decisive effect on the fighting on that front.

3. There is, however, a further question which is probably more serious from the Soviet point of view than that of guerrilla warfare and sabotage in Poland itself. They cling to the belief that there are malign influences in London, Washington and elsewhere which are intent upon delaying the opening of a second front on the continent of Europe and generally holding up the war efforts of the western Allies until such time as the Soviet Union is sufficiently weakened; and they are convinced, I am told, that various Polish refugees, including some of General Sikorski's mixed team, though not necessarily General Sikorski himself, are among the most active of these influences. It is possible that the policy represented by "Free Poland" has as one of its principal objects the forcing of the Polish Government, or of the Governments of the countries in which Polish refugees work and write, to make more strenuous efforts than hitherto to suppress the expression of views which, read in isolation or through coloured spectacles, might seem to favour the policy which Soviet suspicion has ascribed to these refugees. A reflection of this aspect of the question is to be found in the references to MM. Matuszewski, Wysocki and Kozlowski, whose real histories are doubtless familiar to you and of whom the first two can, I am assured by the Polish Embassy, be regarded as entirely above suspicion, while the third has lost whatever credit he may once have had with the German Government.

4. The frontier question also receives attention. Among other references "W.W." (who may be Wanda Wasilewska, although she also writes under her full name) stresses the fact that the Ukrainians and White Russians will always look to Kiev and Minsk and have no desire to be incorporated afresh in Poland.

5. Recent developments in Soviet-Polish relations have led some people to think that the Soviet Government, having despaired of inducing General Sikorski to accept their territorial claims, have decided to set up a rival Polish Government in this country, or at any rate to set one up in Poland when the Soviet forces have chased the German forces away.

6. The immediate setting up of a rival Government would, apart from anything else, greatly complicate Soviet relations with Great Britain and the

<sup>(1)</sup> Not printed.

[40—66]