productive capacity with reference to this war, and the government have to make a decision as to how that can be best divided. Is it being divided in the best way at the present time? The other day the Minister of Finance broke down this tremendous appropriation of \$1,300,000,000: some \$660,-000,000 for the army, over \$400,000,000 for the air force, and \$175,000,000 or \$180,000,000 for the navy. Well, is that the best division? In some quarters we are told that actually the appropriation for the army may go up to \$800,000,000; for the air force, to close to \$500,000,000, and for the navy, to nearly \$200,000,000. Why is the division made on that particular basis? We should know. We believe, for instance, that our contribution-I am talking now not about our contribution with reference to foodstuffs but to the actual prosecution of the fighting services part in the war-should follow three lines.

First, our main contribution, as has been outlined by the Prime Minister, should be the supplying of planes and trained air personnel to Great Britain. We have understood that that was the cornerstone of the government's war policy. Yet from all we can gather, almost twice as much will be spent on the army as on the air force. Has there been a change of policy? If so, there should be some statement of the government's war policy. If our main contribution is to be aeroplanes and trained air personnel, why is not the vote for that particular department larger than it is, rather than the increase shown in some

of the other departments? In the second place, we believe that the army's contribution should be divided two ways: the training of a highly mechanized and highly skilled expeditionary force, and the training of militia for the defence of Canada. Personally I should like to know from the Minister of National Defence, at some stage in the discussion of these appropriations, whether he believes that the tremendous amount of money now being spent in the training of men who are not attested, who will not be sent overseas, who in many cases could not be sent overseas, would not be better expended either in training the expeditionary force, in building planes, or in training air personnel. We have a right to know why the government has divided this appropriation in the way it has done. What is the policy back of it?

The third aspect of war policy relates to the navy. I mention it as such because what we require in Canada is a navy capable of patrolling the coasts of Canada and protecting us against occasional raiders.

That is a summary of the war policy which we believe should be followed.

The second suggestion that we want to make is that the Department of Munitions and Supply might with advantage be divided into two parts, as I suggested in this house last year; that a department of aircraft production should be set up; that the department now has become large and unwieldy; that if, as has been said repeatedly in this chamber by members of the cabinet, our primary contribution is to be the production of planes and the training of air personnel, it merits the setting up of a separate department to take care of that particular activity.

The third thing we suggest is that industry be mobilized so as to increase the efficiency of our production of war materials. Under the National Resources Mobilization Act the government has the power to mobilize industry. I do not know whether they consider they have done so; certainly we do not. We maintain that, for instance, each industry should be developed on a unit basis; that the aircraft industry ought to be a unit directed by a minister of aircraft production and his officials, every firm to be merely a part of that unit; and that where it is necessary to take over a plant, or where the government has spent the money to build a plant, it should call upon the required personnel to produce the planes in that plant either on a management fee or some other basis; but that the entire production of war material in Canada should be organized on a unit basis, with industry conscripted or mobilized around particular article which the producing.

A while ago the minister was speaking here of the subcontractors of Federal Aircraft. There is no reason why the minister or his department for the production of aircraft, taking Federal Aircraft and the work it is doing immediately under his department, could not deal direct with each one of these subcontractors and organize them into a unit. The principle applies not only to that industry; other industrialists and technicians should be mobilized into industry. I confess that I have been troubled to read in the press from time to time in the last few months of so-called dollar-a-year men who had left the departments because of the pressure of their own business. It has happened in a number of cases. There was Mr. Duncan, the former master-general of the ordnance, and Mr. Campbell. At least half a dozen have left Ottawa in the past six to eight months. There may have been other reasons, but the reason given was pressure of their own business. Personally I do not like that. If there were other reasons they should have been stated. If these gentlemen were not efficient and were not doing their job as they should have been, that is all right. But if the reason given