

from cease-fire negotiations, with the Peking Government while its troops were still attacking United Nations forces. We have been willing to have the United Nations discuss with the Chinese Communists a settlement in Korea and throughout the Far East, but we have not been willing at any time to ask members of the United Nations to participate in such discussions under duress while their men were being killed in Korea. The point of principle here, and the practical consequences of abandoning it, I think are of such crucial importance that this is one issue on which we have never been prepared to compromise.

There are those in this country who assert, and do so quite often and quite vehemently, that our willingness to seek an arrangement on the issue of a cease-fire first and talks afterwards was dishonourable and, as they called it, "appeasement". Those who hold such views I think are mistaken about the character of our policy and about the nature of appeasement itself. What they have in mind, no doubt, is such action as was taken at Munich in 1938. Appeasement as defined by those events begins with illusions about the potential aggressor, and ends with the betrayal of a friend in response to pressure exercised by that aggressor in the hope that such yielding will give one immunity from attack. How different such a course is from the policy which has been advocated by this government in this matter may be seen by examining the same broadcast in which I suggested negotiations with the Chinese Communists. Having made that suggestion I went on at once to say:

We must not allow this process--or the situation which makes it necessary--to weaken our resolve or interfere with our plan to strengthen our defences. Above all, we must not allow it to weaken the unity or friendly co-operation of those countries in the free world who are now working together so closely for the good purpose of establishing conditions of stability and peace in the world.

In that, and in other statements made at the time, I stressed the danger in which we stood and the sacrifices which it demanded of us. Far from trying to lull our people into a sense of false security by a move which could rightly be interpreted as appeasement, I have said, and other members of the government have said time and again as I say now, that the free world is in the greatest possible danger. A cease-fire in Korea would not have removed that danger, but it would, however, have put us in a stronger position to meet it.

If those of us who have advocated negotiations of this kind with the Chinese Communists are appeasers we are in very good company. It will not, I think, be argued in this house that Mr. Churchill is a man likely to truckle to or appease aggressors. What are his views on the present situation? Speaking in the House of Commons at Westminster on December 14, he said:

The only prudent course open to the United States and ourselves is to stabilize the local military position ...

That is in Korea.