

Austria by the Nazis in 1938 provides an illuminating example. The Austrian Government had appointed the Nazi Seyss-Inquart as Chancellor under the threat of German invasion. Just before his appointment, Hitler ordered German troops across the border. Goering thereupon dictated over the telephone to the German Embassy in Vienna a telegram which Seyss-Inquart was to send Hitler to justify the military action which already had been initiated. The telegram asked the German Government to send troops as soon as possible to prevent bloodshed. Goering told the German Embassy that it was not necessary for Seyss-Inquart to send the telegram -- all that he needed to do was agree with its terms. The Embassy merely informed Goering later that the Austrian Chancellor had agreed and the telegram which was never sent was quoted to show that Austria had requested the presence of German troops to prevent disorder.

This sordid little story illustrates, I think, some of the difficulties of dealing with the problem of indirect aggression by means of a specific obligation couched in the necessary legalistic language of a Treaty. It is, however, true that under Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty the signatories do agree to consult together whenever the political independence of any of them is threatened. This could mean when political independence is threatened from within by activities inspired, armed and directed from without. It is, therefore, possible to meet the problem of indirect aggression under the Treaty, if the problem is clear and the danger is obvious. But at the same time it should be noted that there is nothing in the Treaty which gives the participants the right to meddle in each other's purely internal affairs. Nor, and this is just as important, is there anything in the Treaty which gives any member the right to demand assistance from other members in dealing with a domestic political difficulty.

There are three other articles of the Pact which I would like to mention. The first is Article 3, which reads:

"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."

In examining this article we must remember that the Atlantic Pact is only one link in the economic, political and military chain which the west is forging to protect a free society. It would be clearly as unwise to expect this link to do the work of the whole chain as it would be to strengthen it at the expense of other important links. Furthermore, "self-help and mutual aid" is a pretty general expression, which extends beyond the possession and the supplying of adequate arms. Indeed, it has already been recognized in Washington, that economic aid and military aid are complementary, and that if the two should conflict in the effort to strengthen Western Europe, the former should be given priority.

The problem, against an active political background, of striking a balance between the economic needs and the defence requirements of a healthy and secure Western Europe is not one for which I can present a neat solution. The extremes to be avoided are obvious. If Western Europe used too much of her productive capacity for defence, and received too much of her help in the form of armaments, she might be armed to the teeth but stripped to the bone. The resulting political weakness would more than offset the security gained from the possession of adequate new weapons. On

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