

natural part of their mandate to report casualties from these mines, and their location. This was especially true in a post-conflict situation where the parties to the conflict had resolved their differences and moved on to post-conflict reconstruction. Later in the campaign groups like Human Rights Watch produced excellent technical work on the mines themselves- who made them, how they, worked, etc. And for those states reluctant to join, the security and military aspects of the issue took priority. But for the most part it was a coalition forged on a humanitarian consensus, which allowed humanitarian NGOs to play a major role. For small arms and light weapons this situation is only in its infancy. As stated in the previous section, it will be difficult to stigmatize any specific weapon *per se* which is the backbone of every armed force in the world. It is their use in specific types of situations, by certain groups, and particularly against civilian targets, that must be dealt with. These goals will be difficult to accomplish with a primary focus on a ban on a certain type of weapon.

More importantly, many of the NGOs which have entered this field are veterans of battles involving the arms trade, military expenditures, and the other security issues which dominated the Cold War. This has several implications. First, these NGOs will seldom have links with the humanitarian NGOs so critical to focusing the world's attention on the damage being done by these weapons. Second, they will have a natural tendency to lean toward a supply-focused solution, since most come from industrialized states which in the past have been guilty of fueling such conflicts. This accusation is less true now than in previous eras, especially since many of the arms are left over and recirculating from Cold War conflicts. Third, such NGOs are not experienced in working in developing countries, where often it is demand-side factors which need to be addressed. And given the taboo in many developing countries regarding citizen involvement in security matters, it is proving difficult to develop such NGOs. Fourth, since these NGOs have an arms control and disarmament focus they have little capability to influence governmental policy or international organizations, especially when compared with environmental NGOs. The norm of governmental monopoly on military information is alive and well. Fifth, those humanitarian, refugee and development NGOs which could participate in developing solutions to the problems from small arms and light weapons are restricted from doing so by a traditional taboo against getting involved in military matters, less their status and presence in the country be threatened. This was not the case with land mines, where a consensus within the conflict zones had emerged against such weapons. The monopoly that many states had on military information has declined somewhat in the post-Cold War era, as seen in the rise in illicit trade. However, this does not mean that NGOs necessarily have a bigger role in providing arms data to governments. Tracking illicit arms dealing is very dangerous work.

MULTIPLE APPROACHES

In his General Assembly speech, Foreign Minister Axworthy stated that "land mines are not the only complex, cross-cutting problem to be addressed if we are to reduce or prevent conflict. All too often it is small arms, rather than the weapons systems targeted by disarmament efforts, that cause the greatest bloodshed today. In the hands of terrorists, criminals and the irregular militia and armed bands typical of internal conflict, these are true weapons of mass terror." With the building blocks in