

January 1991, he told a reporter for ABC-TV that he had "been pursuing a carrot-and-stick policy here. The carrot is, if he [i.e., Saddam Hussein] withdraws completely and unconditionally from Kuwait, he doesn't get the stick."³⁶ The unbending attitude, perhaps appropriate in the circumstances, ensured that economic sanctions, at least in the form they were implemented, were an inappropriate strategy for the occasion. Coalition leaders were intent on maximizing Saddam Hussein's humiliation so as to deter other aggressors, and were prepared to adopt violent means to achieve that goal.

Moreover, the nature of the Iraqi government provided little opportunity for finesse in focusing the sanctions regime. It appears that those Iraqi businessmen with most influence were content to make personal profits by using their position in the party to manipulate the black market, which may actually have been facilitated by the sanctions regime. Similarly, the profiteering enjoyed by the current *de facto* rulers in Haiti underlines this lesson. It is problematic whether increased sophistication in the management of sanctions could be counted on to produce significantly more effective coercion, except where there are unusually strong cultural and historical reasons at work within the target state in favour of compliance, as there were during the Suez crisis.

Another partial explanation of the failure of the sanctions employed against Iraq is that time measured in months is short for economic controls to achieve results. In 1966 Prime Minister Wilson confidently declared that Rhodesia would be forced to abandon its rebellion by sanctions in a matter of "weeks not months." However, the rebellion lasted 14 years and the impact of sanctions was only a contributory factor in the final denouement. This experience was noted somewhat sarcastically in the Security Council in 1990 by ambassador Al-Ashtal of Yemen when opposing the passage of resolution 678:

It is a little surprising that those who used to lecture us on the need to be patient for sanctions to work when they had to do with Rhodesia or South Africa are today in such a hurry to declare that those comprehensive and enforceable sanctions imposed on Iraq are simply not working. For sanctions to work and force Iraq to implement resolutions of the Security Council we need patience.³⁷

The use which had been made of large scale troop deployments to the Gulf in the hope of intimidating the Iraq government created technical and political problems which made it impossible to delay the start of land operations much beyond the deadline date of 15 January. In effect, the efforts at psychological warfare necessarily aborted those

³⁶ United States, Department of State, Dispatch 2/1 (17 January 1991).

³⁷ SCVR, Provisional, 29 November S/PV 2963.