

permissive and compulsory. The notification of major military manoeuvres in Europe — which is defined for this purpose as extending 250 kilometres into the Soviet Union (and Turkey) — involving a total of 25,000 troops or more, is compulsory. The exchange of observers at these or other military exercises is voluntary. There are also additional permissive measures that encourage the notification of other smaller manoeuvres as well as major military movements.

Since 1975 the compulsory notification of all major manoeuvres in Europe has been honoured by all CSCE signatories in accordance with the terms of the agreement, with one possible exception by the Soviet Union at the time of the Polish crisis. (There was some ambiguity as to whether all of the troops involved were in fact within the 250 kilometre CSCE zone of the Soviet Union.) Observers have been invited to some manoeuvres but when the Soviets were hosts the opportunities for meaningful observation were quite restricted. NATO countries and some of the neutral and non-aligned nations have notified Warsaw Pact states of some small manoeuvres. No one has given prior notification of a military movement, as distinct from a field exercise or manoeuvre.

Thus the record of implementation can be appraised as generally satisfactory, as far as the letter of the agreement is concerned. But it also indicates that firm, clear obligations are required for CBMs to be effective, and that voluntary measures add little to mutual confidence. With this in mind a mandate was agreed at the Madrid CSCE review meeting to enter into new negotiations to develop a tighter compulsory regime and to proceed further. Significantly, the name of the new measures was changed to confidence and "security building" measures.

*CDE**

Stockholm was selected as the venue for these negotiations which began in January 1984. No agreement has yet been reached. To overcome the weaknesses of the existing CBMs and their limited area of application the agreed mandate calls for compulsory measures to cover the whole of Europe,

* This again is a misnomer. Negotiation of a mandate for this conference proved to be very difficult and until it could be accomplished the conference had no name. For ease of daily reference it picked up the shorthand appellation "Conference on Disarmament in Europe" or CDE, a title that is still used informally. The formal, correct title that was eventually agreed is "Conference on Confidence and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe".

which is understood to mean eastward to the Ural mountain range in the Soviet Union. These measures are to be "of military significance and politically binding" as well as verifiable. Progress in Stockholm will be assessed at the next main CSCE review meeting commencing in Vienna in late 1986 and the CDE mandate provides for the possibility of supplementing the Stockholm effort at that time, by adding other more substantial disarmament topics to the CDE agenda.

The goals of participants from NATO countries at the CDE are to reduce the possibilities of surprise and to enhance predictability. To achieve these goals, they want to have all parties make more information available about peacetime military activities, and to accept on-site observers and inspectors.

With these aims in mind NATO participants tabled proposals on: a) the exchange of information on the structure of ground and air forces in the area; b) an annual exchange of forecasts of military activities as well as notifications to be given closer to those events; c) a tightening of provisions for observers to attend such activities; d) means of verifying compliance with these measures, including on-site inspections; e) an enhancement of the means of communication between states. The proposals of the neutral and non-aligned participants are similar, but these nations have added measures that would constrain certain activities, such as placing a ceiling on the size of permitted exercises.

For their part, the Soviets and their allies have espoused what is known as a "declaratory approach," with, as a centrepiece, a proposal for a declaration on the non-use of force. This approach is consistent with Soviet initiatives in other forums such as the UN General Assembly.

As to prospects for an agreement, hard bargaining has only just begun and it is very often the case in successful arms control negotiations that essential compromises are made, not because of intrinsic merit, but as a result of outside events that heighten the political will on both sides to find mutually acceptable solutions. For the CDE, the CSCE review meeting in 1986 with its attendant assessment of progress in Stockholm, may well provide sufficient incentive for some sort of an accord to be reached.

COMMENTARY

In the context of the East-West confrontation, the MBFR talks seek reductions and controls on conventional forces while negotiations on nuclear weapons are left to the two superpowers. CSCE addresses the multifaceted political dimension. The approaches to arms control in MBFR and the CSCE/CDE differ. The former seeks manpower and armament reductions and limitations from the outset,