

7. The functioning of the Agency's relationship with the United Nations system should be examined. A chemical weapons verification agency could be connected in some way to the United Nations system, and the difficulties this arrangement might create, and how these might be approached, should be considered.
8. The Agency's Director General position suggests a model for the chief administrative officer of a chemical weapons verification agency. However, the history and character of this position should be studied in greater detail.
9. The Agency's personnel policies and practices should be closely examined, with respect to both its general staff and its inspection personnel. The Agency seems to have been able to deal successfully with some problems found in other international organizations, such as colonization of positions, sponsorship, and geographic criteria of recruitment. On the other hand, its policies on promotion and tenure, and its problems in attracting lower-level professional personnel, indicate some difficulties. The relative merits of a career staff (especially an inspectorate) as opposed to a short-term staff should be carefully considered.
10. The Agency's information management should be examined, from the perspective of a variety of issues that will also arise for a chemical weapons verification agency. First, what information is necessary for safeguards on industrial production processes? Second, what overlaps exist between the information requirements of Agency safeguards on the one hand and national and plant operator controls on the other? The Agency probably exploits some compatibilities in this regard, but there could also be incompatibilities that must be taken into account. Third, what "transmission problems" occur in acquiring data from national sources and plant operators, in terms of language, delays and other difficulties, and what steps might remedy these? Fourth, what are the information management practices and problems within the Agency, including the working-up of data and reports, the handling of anomalies to ensure that they are dealt with promptly rather than delayed or overlooked, and security procedures? Fifth, what information could reasonably be made public about the results of safeguards efforts?
11. The functioning of the Agency's Agreement on Privileges and Immunities seems to work fairly well. It should be studied, in general terms for the Agency and for inspectors, and particularly with respect to the difficulties that might arise for challenge inspections. Some other areas of study could include problems of the movement of samples and equipment, and of multiple- versus single-entry visas. The possibility of strengthening procedures under this agreement should be examined.