

13. The principal actors in the internal disagreements were France and the United States. For example, in procedural matters, France insisted upon NNA participation in the negotiations and, thus, an explicit link to the CSCE. The French government wished to avoid the bloc-to-bloc approach that had characterized the MBFR discussions; it feared that a formal NATO proposal would create the impression that France had indirectly reentered NATO's integrated command, thereby disrupting the domestic right/centre/left defence consensus (Dean, "Can NATO Unite to Reduce Forces in Europe?" p. 17). For its part, the American government wished to avoid linkage to the CSCE. For one reason, the Administration felt that it had been pressured to accept a less-than-satisfactory agreement at Stockholm under the pressure of the CSCE schedule, and, consequently, it did not want to have the same CSCE-related time pressures interfere with the new negotiations (*The Arms Control Reporter* 1986, p. 401.B.123).
14. "Brussels Declaration on Conventional Arms Control by Ministers at North Atlantic Council Session," *NATO Review* 34 (December 1986): 27-28.
15. "Memorandum of the Polish People's Republic on Arms Reduction and Confidence-Building in Central Europe, Transmitted on 17 July 1987 to the States Participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Polish People's Republic," in Krause, *Prospects for Conventional Arms Control in Europe*, pp. 77-9.
16. The most significant event in conventional disarmament during this period was Mikhail Gorbachev's announcement before the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 1988 that the Soviet Union would unilaterally reduce its armed forces by 500 000 men over the next two years. Six tank divisions would be removed from the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and Hungary by 1991, totaling 50 000 men and 5 000 tanks. Combined with reductions in the European U.S.S.R., force reductions in the region from the inter-German border to the Urals would amount to 10 000 tanks, 8 500 artillery systems, and 800 combat aircraft (*Speech by Mikhail Gorbachev at the UIN General Assembly*, News Release no. 97, Press Office of the U.S.S.R. Embassy in Canada, 8 December 1989, p. 21).
17. The mandate talks were almost derailed in the final hours by a dispute arising between Greece and Turkey on the definition of the southern boundary of the CFE area. Soviet and Turkish negotiators had agreed on a line that excluded the port of Mersin on the Mediterranean coast. The Greek government objected to this exclusion, however, since Mersin was used to supply Turkish forces in Cyprus. Nevertheless, the mandate was signed on 14 January after NATO offered to resolve the dispute internally in later talks (*The Arms Control Reporter* 1989, p. 407.B.115-17).
18. "Mandate for Negotiation on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe," in CSCE: *A Framework for Europe's Future*, p. 44.
19. Michael Gordon, "Cutting Arms in Europe: It's Down to the Details," *The New York Times*, 9 March 1989, p. 6.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *The Arms Control Reporter* 1989, p. 407.B.176.
22. This policy was originally proposed at the Geneva summit conference in July 1955 by President Eisenhower. The proposal was intended to reduce the risks of surprise nuclear attack through a comprehensive exchange of information on each side's military forces and facilities combined with a system of aerial reconnaissance and ground inspection. The Soviet Union rejected the proposal, maintaining that the plan was "nothing more than a bald espionage plot" (Jerome H. Kahan, *Security in the Nuclear Age: Developing U.S. Strategic Arms Policy* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975), p. 56).
23. "Proposals for a Free and Peaceful Europe," speech by President George Bush, *Current Policy* no. 1179 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 1989), p. 3.
24. Thomas Friedman, "NATO's Proposal on Aircraft Cuts Ready, Baker Says," *The New York Times*, 13 July 1989, p. 1.