

Without any meaningful and accurate method of verification, the exercise of publishing "standardized" expenditure figures would be very difficult to initiate and far too prone to self-serving propagandizing on all sides. This is a good example of how some Confidence-Building proposals could actually result in "Confidence Reduction".

2. **The exchange of information on the composition of forces.** This proposal – actually a series of related proposals – calls for the (usually regular) exchange of information outlining at least one of the following: manpower figures, general deployment plans, the designation of specific deployed units, the location of specific units, the quantities of certain types of equipment, and the locations of certain types of equipment. These proposals usually focus on troops and equipment in specific sensitive areas. One proposal even includes the exchange of information about command structures. These proposals generally aim to reduce uncertainty and to institute or increase the habitual flow of information between adversary military organizations. This type of arrangement has already been initiated in SALT II which included an exchange of data on nuclear delivery vehicles. To the extent that released information can be verified with reasonable precision, such proposals would likely provide a constructive, if quite modest, improvement in military relations, thereby building confidence.
3. **Seminar on Strategy.**<sup>57</sup> This and several similar ideas call for formal or informal meetings amongst protagonists designed to encourage the discussion of various strategic outlooks, perhaps within the framework of a Standing Consultative Commission-like body. Military doctrine – conventional and strategic nuclear – and various aspects of broader military policy as well as deployments could be discussed and even debated amongst professional military, political and analytical representa-

tives of various countries in order to increase understanding and decrease ethnocentrism. One proposal goes so far as to suggest discussions ("elucidation") on three levels: "(1) Non-negotiable programs to be undertaken no matter what the other side does, (2) action planned but changeable if the other side is willing to do certain things, and (3) long lead-time options which both sides might usefully preclude."<sup>58</sup> Although similar to more straightforward exchange programmes where participants get to "know" each other, the "seminar on strategy" idea is far more narrowly concerned with sensitizing potential adversaries to each other's distinctive "strategic cultures". The aim is to counter simple-minded mirror-image thinking and thereby permit new insights into adversary behaviour. The basic difficulty with such an enterprise resides in getting participants to freely discuss sensitive defence issues. The danger (one discussed at greater length later) lies in becoming too "forgiving" of or insensitive to the physical realities of adversary military behaviour (i.e. "It's O.K. Don't worry about the number of tanks. They're paranoid about invasion and always feel safer with large defences").

4. **Exchange of defence industry data.** Primarily associated with the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues study *Common Security*, this idea assumes that one of the dominant causes of the arms race is inadequate information about adversary defence industry activity, especially in the Research and Development area. The point of the proposal is to provide a forum where representatives of defence ministries could discuss features of their own as well as other states' military research, development and acquisition policies. With greater understanding and knowledge of various research programmes – so the argument goes – there would be less chance of the typical over-reaction to

<sup>57</sup> Johan Holst is best known for this proposal. "Confidence-Building Measures: A Conceptual Framework," *Survival*, vol. XXIV, no. 1, p. 6.

<sup>58</sup> Joseph Nye's idea described in Alton Frye's "Building Confidence Between Adversaries: An American Perspective" in Birnbaum, *Confidence Building and East-West Relations*, p. 40. Frye has also suggested that the U.S. and the Soviet Union consciously adopt a common strategy doctrine in order to reduce current doctrinal asymmetries.

