

marines or to impose a moratorium on their construction or proliferation would be so strongly opposed by many nations that they would be doomed to failure. He argued that a similar fate would befall any measures seeking to exclude states from portions of the high seas. He thought that confidence-building measures involving meetings, the exchange of naval visits, and agreements designed to prevent incidents at sea

Southeast Asia, where a naval arms race is in progress.

Dr. Ross argued that desirable naval ACD measures would include:

- the denuclearization of ships and attack submarines and/or a ban on all SLCMs;
- a ban or deep cuts in counterforce-capable sea-launched ballistic missiles such as Trident II;
- a nuclear-free zone for parts of the Pacific, such as the Northwest;
- reciprocal anti-submarine warfare (ASW)-free zones;
- a variety of CSBMs such as the notification of naval exercises, exchanges between naval officer training schools, and agreements to prevent incidents at sea.

Turning to the potential Canadian role in naval ACD, Dr. Ross suggested that Canada should concentrate its diplomatic efforts on Tokyo and Moscow, perhaps encouraging the Soviets to opt for solely Arctic basing of their ballistic missile submarine fleet. In addition, Canada should promote transparency at sea by investing in satellite inspection and verification technologies. Although such activities would be expensive, Dr. Ross argued that the costs of doing nothing are also high. He also recommended that Canada oppose the offensive dimension of the US maritime strategy.

In the subsequent discussion, one participant echoed Dr. Ross's assertion that without naval ACD, countries will move to unilateral naval solutions involving increasingly sophisticated technology. It was suggested that emerging nuclear-weapon powers, in particular, will be interested in developing the submarine as a delivery platform. This participant argued that modern nuclear-powered submarines pose an enormous offensive threat and that many countries in both North and South have an interest in restricting access to submarine technology. He advocated movement towards a nuclear-powered submarine

control — i.e., non-proliferation — regime.

Several participants observed that the initiative for naval ACD must come from the US and that Canada is not likely to have much influence on this issue. One participant argued that Canada is perceived by other Pacific nations, such as Japan, as playing a minimal role in the Pacific and therefore as having little right to a say in Pacific security matters. A number of participants agreed that the notion of credibility is important if Canada wishes to have a voice on naval ACD issues. It was suggested that to have credibility in the North Pacific, Canada must demonstrate commitment and risk in the region.

Some participants felt that Canada's greatest hope for influence on naval ACD issues lies in "nudging" the US to be more open to naval talks of one sort or another. Another participant argued, however, that Canada is not likely to be able to nudge the US very far and that attempting to do so could raise suspicions among other countries about Canada's commitment to naval ACD. It was suggested that Canada should instead take action on issues that benefit its maritime security but on which the US does not have a strong position. For example, Canada could conduct ecological surveillance of the oceans, making public every instance of suspicious activity it finds. Other suggestions included that Canada should spend the money necessary to improve maritime transparency in all areas, and that it should use the UN as the primary vehicle for promoting naval ACD.

One participant suggested that naval ACD is going to be a long, incremental process, beginning with simple CSBMs and political solutions to regional disputes. A couple of participants questioned whether naval forces could be dealt with in a vacuum, given Soviet suggestions that future CFE and START agreements will be dependent on the inclusion of naval forces, and given Soviet efforts to circumvent the CFE Treaty by transferring Treaty-limited equipment to naval units. It was suggested that we may see a hiatus in meaningful ACD at any level until naval armaments are dealt with.

Credibility important if Canada wishes to have a voice on naval ACD issues.

were worth pursuing. In addition, he saw potential in an "open seas" transparency measure.

In his presentation, Dr. Ross noted that there has been a significant pulling back from confrontation in recent years in the Pacific. US and Soviet forces have been shrinking through modernization and this trend is likely to continue, although it has not been matched by reduced defence spending by other countries in East and Southeast Asia. While an early start to naval arms control negotiations would be desirable, strong US opposition to formal negotiations makes the early prospect of significant naval ACD highly unlikely.

According to Dr. Ross, naval ACD would be beneficial in terms of lowering the costs of naval development, reducing the risk of inadvertent war caused by the deployment of new systems capable of surprise attack, and stemming the proliferation of new naval warfare technologies to third countries. In Dr. Ross's view, the US is turning away from a closing "window of opportunity" to stabilize developments in the Pacific through naval ACD. There is a need for collective security arrangements and reciprocal naval confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) to prevent a rush into unilateral improvements in naval technology. Dr. Ross said that Canada's proposal for a North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue is a step in the right direction, although its prospects for success seem limited. He suggested that there is also a need for regional security arrangements in