REAL POINT OF A STATE OF A

influence elsewhere, the right Canadian decision would be to go for that. this choice does not arise. For Canada can have no influence on U.S. policy unless Canada has influence elsewhere. For only if Canada has some influence with other nations, can Canada's influence be used at all by those within the U.S. Government, who could use our support. For example, in a tug-of-warbetween say the White House and the Senate, on some issue in which the President But Wanted and the Senate leadership opposed, the policy we thought desirable, the wanted and the behave readership opposed, the poincy we thought desirable, the only possible way the President could privately use Canada's support would be for him to point to the actions Canada might get several nations to take, in the U.N. or otherwise. Canada by itself could be shrugged off quite easily by the Senate; a group of nations whom Canada could get to act with her could not be shrugged off

Since Canada's influence within the U.S. depends directly on Canada's influence with the other Western nations and with the unaligned nations, it follows that, for Canada to have any influence in the desired direction even within the U.S. government, Canada must make clear to those other nations (as well as to the U.S.) her determination to maintain an independent foreign and defence This must mean that Canada cannot afford to go so far in ingratiating herself with the U.S. as to diminish seriously her standing with other western and

It is sometimes argued that by becoming a faithful and co-operative

supporter of the U.S. policies, taking our expected place in NATO and in any other arrangements that might be proposed by the U.S. we would gain significant influence with the U.S. It should now be apparent that this is not so. blanket endorsement of U.S. policy, or anything that appeared to be such endorsement, could only harm us with the other western and the non-aligned nations, and so directly diminish our possible influence in the desired direction within the U.S. Government

There is a further reason why it is impossible to maximize Canadian influence in the desired direction with the U.S. by committing ourselves to a general acceptance of U.S. policies. The reason is simply that U.S. policies are, and except for external pressures will continue to be, as likely to go in the undesired as in the desired direction. For the U.S. having undertaken the the undestred as in the destred direction. For the 0.5. Having undertaken the overwhelming proportion of the burden of military defence of the West, and having undertaken to carry it out by a policy of massive nuclear deterrence, has necessarily given a very powerful place to the military-industrial interests who are committed to given a very powerrur place to the milliony industrial interests who are commit the arms race and to the foreign policies that go with it. U.S. policy must be expected to go on being heavily influenced in this way. To accept all the main lines of U.S. policy in the hope of influencing U.S. policy would thus be self-

In short, to maximize the effectiveness of a realistic Canadian defence policy, Canada must above all make clear her independence of U.S. policy. This is to be done not with any chimerical intention of being a wholly independent and to be done not with any chimerical intention of being a whorry independent and self-sufficient state, or of asserting her independent sovereign status, but to free herself to work for a more realistic long-term world policy in ways which the U.S. cannot do because of its size, its reputation and its commitment to massive