ant enactments bearing on the question. This was a very disconcerting reflection on the diligence of the advocate, and he scarce knew how to reply.

"I think—your Lordship—must be in error. I have endeavored to give the Court with rather unusual fulness a reference to all legislation, which could possibly affect the matter. I cannot hazard a guess at the enactment to which your Lordship alludes."

"You surprise me, Mr. ————, because I certainly thought every student was familiar with the Act respecting Short Forms of Conveyances."

It is customary for the Judges to note with more or less fulness the points taken by counsel upon arguments before them. Sometimes they can do so very shortly, and this independently of the length of the argument. A gentleman who occupied some hours in his client's interest (as he fondly believed), was not a little chagrined, on happening to see the Judge's book accidentally some time afterwards, to find the following brief epitome following his name. "*Vox et præterea nihil.*"

A thermometer has its uses in a court room; but frequent references to it do not tend to reduce the temperature in which Bench and Bar must sometimes labor. A long and intricate injunction motion was before the Court on one of our tropical July days, and the thermometer was consulted from time to time, to justify the prostrated condition in which the participants found themselves. When it reached the 90° mark, the Judge considered the fact worthy of mention—whereupon counsel for the defendants made his point. "Yes, My Lord, a good day, as your Lordship sees, for dissolving an injunction."

Mr. ————, was arguing for a certain position with much strenuousness but little success. The Court could not, would not, follow him, but he nevertheless persevered. At length, overcome by the seeming absurdity of one of his contentions, the representative of Justice became a trifle ruffled. and broke out: "I do believe that you would endeavor to prove to me that two and two are, or can be, anything else than four." To which speedily and cheerfully came the reply! "Why, certainly, my Lord, I should not despair of convincing your Lordship that in proper juxtaposition two and two would be twenty-two."

A piece of very important city litigation lasted for several weary weeks, and from time to time the leading counsel on one side stated his personal opinion with increasing positiveness upon a certain point in the case. At the outset he contented himself with argument, but conviction grew, and, in his closing address, he put it plainly that no human being with the gift of reason could, by any possibility, differ from his conclusion. The leader who opposed him suffered in silence until the time came for his reply, and then delivered, by way of reminiscence, his rebuke for this substitution of personal conviction for argument:—"My learned friend recalls to me the unfortunate position in which, some years ago, a late learned leader of the bar found himself. He was engaged at the trial of a case, and his client failed. Being consulted as to an appeal, he delivered a very positive opinion in his client's favor, and the case was carried to appeal, where again he was unsuccessful. His view was only fortified by this mischance, and he reiterated it in still stronger terms. The action went through the usual gamut of appeals, upon this learned counsel's statement that no sane and reasonable man could hold a conclusion different from his own. Alas, for human fallibility, in the fulness of time, it was his lot to appear before the Supreme Court and to find himself addressing a *Bench of lunatics.*"

A very well known Q. C., of the days gone by, was haranguing the old Court of Error and Appeal, and although his argument was very long