

CASE STATED BY JUSTICES—POINT RAISED IN DIVISIONAL COURT
NOT TAKEN BEFORE JUSTICES—QUESTION OF LAW.

Kates v. Jeffery (1914), 3 K.B. 160. In this case the question arose to what extent a point can be taken in a Divisional Court on a case stated by justices, which was not taken before the justices. The Divisional Court (Darling, Avory, and Rowlatt, JJ.) held that no point can be taken on the facts stated which was not taken before the Justices, but that a question of law, which no evidence could alter, might be taken, though not taken before the Justices.

JUSTICES—APPREHENDED BREACH OF PEACE—RECOGNIZANCE TO
BE OF GOOD BEHAVIOUR—JURISDICTION OF JUSTICES—34
EDW. 3.

Lansbury v. Riley (1914), 3 K.B. 229. This was a case stated by a magistrate. The defendant was summoned on an information charging him with being a disturber of the peace and an inciter of others to commit breaches of the peace. It appeared, by the evidence, that the defendant was a supporter, though not a member, of the Women's Social and Political Union, a suffragette organization which had for its object the commission of crimes in order to secure votes for women—and of late several crimes had been committed by members of the union, and it was proved that the defendant had delivered speeches urging the women to continue breaking the law. The Magistrate ordered him to enter into recognizances to be of good behaviour, and in default to be imprisoned for three months. The defendant contended that neither under the statute, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1, or under his commission had the Magistrate jurisdiction to make such an order, but the Divisional Court (Bray, Avory, and Lush, JJ.) held that whatever the origin of the jurisdiction might be, whether derived from the common law, statute or otherwise, the practice of making such orders, for the purpose of preventing apprehended breaches of the peace, was too well established to admit of its being now questioned, and that it was not necessary that it should be shewn that any individual person had been put in bodily fear by the defendant.

DEFAMATION—LIBEL—ANNUAL MEETING OF LICENSING JUSTICES
—APPLICATION FOR LICENSE—NOTICE OF OBJECTION—PRIVILEGED
OCCASION.

Attwood v. Chapman (1914), 3 K.B. 275, was an action for libel. The libel consisted in a notice given by the defendant of his