

*Super-powers  
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relations*


gic superiority, ignoring the constraints of SALT I, in the proposed SALT II, could have adverse effects on international peace and security. The Soviet leadership would be reinforced in its apparent conviction (evidenced by the Cuban African adventures) that the U.S. has lost its understanding of the political use of military power and the will to use it. Strengthening the Soviet hawks would increase the chances of a major confrontation between the Super-powers and their allies, including Canada.

Disarmament has long been dead, because impossible, and useful only for political rhetoric. But, far from being a year of arms control, 1978 is likely to see the effective end of SALT and a continued lack of progress in MBFR. Even a comprehensive test-ban, if achieved, will restrict the U.S. rather than the U.S.S.R., and will, therefore, be of little worth. Politically, the super-powers are likely to revert to a "limited adversary relationship" (a phrase coined by Marshal Shulman, now President Carter's chief adviser on Soviet affairs). Moreover, the adversary elements are likely to predominate, with or without a SALT II. But the SALT II debate will show which way U.S. public opinion is moving.

This opinion is now clearly, and substantially, shifting to support a much firmer assertion of the United States' legitimate security interests, and those of its real allies. This is also the view on the Hill and, judging by President Carter's recent speeches, that of his Administration - especially "Zib" Brezinski, whose persuading of the President to change his views indicates his growing influence and that of the hardliners in the policymaking and analytical communities. This general shift, described above, has been accelerated by two sets of events. The first has been the new Soviet demands in SALT II, which, if accepted, would make a mockery of the Joint Draft Text the Carter Administration thought both sides had

agreed to. The U.S.S.R. is now arguing, for example, that ALCM-carriers can only comprise U.S. strategic bombers, limiting these to 70-120, and cannot include transport aircraft, like the Boeing 747 *Jumbojet*. Yet this is President Carter's substitute for the B-1 bomber he cancelled last June. Furthermore, the U.S.S.R. is adamant that there shall be no transfer of any cruise-missile technology to U.S. allies, especially in Western Europe, where they are also stepping-up their propaganda campaign against the neutron bomb.

A SALT II treaty meeting these conditions would not only be rejected by the U.S. Senate - it would be so heavily criticized that the Administration would be unlikely to risk signing it until after the mid-term October elections. Indeed, President Carter may find it politically necessary to pull out of SALT II, at least temporarily, this summer. SALT has deteriorated so drastically that the ordinary voter can see that Soviet demands are grotesquely one-sided. But voters are also concerned about the victorious conclusion of the Soviet-Cuban-WPO-backed imperial-colonial war in Ethiopia, which went unopposed, except verbally, by Carter. Quite rightly, the average American, and his representatives, feel that this will only encourage further Soviet use of force. Yugoslavia, after President Tito's death, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, and the Middle East, especially after Israel's move into Southern Lebanon, are favourite candidates for what could become, all too easily, another Korean War, involving the U.S. and its allies in local, limited war against the U.S.S.R. and its allies. Under these circumstances, the prospects for arms control look very bleak. It is, as the late President Kennedy said 17 years ago, after his June 1961 meeting with Russia's Nikita Khrushchov, going to be a long, hard, cold winter.



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