

ing relations between participating states, contained in the Final Act. Principle II, for example, opens with the following words:

The participating states will refrain in their mutual relations, as well as in their international relations in general, from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state . . .

Principle VI, although it is written to apply to the participating states of the CSCE, when read in the light of the more general terminology of Principle II can be expected to imply a wider application. The following words of Principle VI are particularly relevant:

They will . . . in all circumstances refrain from any . . . act of military, or of political, economic or other coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by another (participating) state of the rights inherent in its sovereignty . . .

Afghanistan is, of course, not a participating state, but a principle of this sort has a universality about it that cannot simply be brushed aside. It is as well a paraphrase of important undertakings contained in the United Nations Charter. Can the Western states really gloss over such a fundamental breach of principle? Should they mute their criticism for the sake of advancing certain other important matters? Arguments can be made in both directions. But in my view, there is an insidious danger in setting aside principles, even for the best of reasons. Putting them aside has an uncomfortable way of coming back to haunt later .

Soviet repression

There is another aspect of Soviet conduct, which has its psychological linkage with Afghanistan, and that is the new wave of repression against dissidents and advocates of religious beliefs in the Soviet Union. This brings into play Principle VII asking the states to "promote and encourage the effective exercise of civil, political, economic, social, cultural and other rights and freedoms all of which are derived from the inherent dignity of the human person . . ." and also the wording that follows on this thought, regarding freedom of the individual "to profess and practice . . . religion or belief acting in accordance with the dictates of . . . conscience". The dilemma is there. Should one, in the name of balance, reject highly interesting possibilities in the political basket at the cost of time for consideration and review of implementation of the guiding principles and matters pertaining to Basket III? Inevitably there is a linkage between the willingness of the East to work fruitfully with the other CSCE members on Basket I questions and the mood of the East after having sustained a severe battering over the guiding principles and Basket III.

There seems to be only one way to proceed which gives some chance to the Madrid meeting. This is to prepare all aspects of the work of the conference soberly and intelligently. This means developing the

main proposals in the three baskets in such a way as to point out their considerable mutual benefits. In this way, the 'new proposals' aspect of the conference could have an important attraction for all signatory states.

How one tackles the review of implementation part of the conference is much more problematical. If the CSCE process is to continue to have meaning, the guiding principles and the various other undertakings of the signatories cannot simply be brushed under the carpet. Can these criticisms and failures on the Eastern side be brought out in such a way as to relate them to the desirability of continuing the CSCE process? Can one perhaps shape the criticism in such a way that the future rather than the past is stressed? As a piece of diplomatic legerdemain this will not be easy to achieve. Of course, the Soviet Union and its allies will not fail to have answers and counter-criticisms. Western societies with their healthy penchant for self-criticism offer many quotations from Western sources about the failings of the free democracies. These failings essentially run counter to the rule of law and the sense of equity in our societies and are not conscious acts of policy such as one finds in the suppression of the dissidents in the East. This basic difference will have to be left for discovery by thoughtful students of the contemporary world. Nonetheless, this thorny path is perhaps the only one that offers some hope of the meeting not foundering during the review of implementation stage of its work. It is worth trying.

There are also other important requirements for a successful conference. Belgrade suffered from an overload of not always very well thought out or thoroughly prepared proposals. Madrid will have to have a lighter diet if it is not to suffer from the same sort of indigestion which added to the problems in Belgrade. There is every sign that the way Madrid is being prepared has benefited from the lessons of Belgrade. The process is much more thorough and far-reaching. If the Preparatory Meeting in September is ruthless in removing all proposals that have not stood the test of numerous bilateral soundings, then this hurdle can be overcome.

To sum up, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan has cast a dark shadow over the Madrid Meeting. The relative optimism that prevailed in many capitals has all but evaporated. There is however a general acceptance of the importance of the CSCE process as a valuable instrument for the long-term haul of creating a more cooperative situation in Europe. Of course, the possibility of failure at Madrid cannot be dismissed. The strains created by the Soviet Union are many and serious. But the determination to preserve the CSCE process, even in this unpromising time of tension, might just bring about the necessary conditions for some results from what will inevitably be an extremely difficult and demanding conference. There is a possibility of accomplishing something; at a minimum, foundations can be laid for future useful work when the world returns to a more propitious time.