

the acceptance of the Dawes scheme in its entirety, and mentioned, rather as aims than as conditions of acceptance, three points:—

- (1.) The restoration of the economic and financial unity of Germany.
- (2.) The return to the occupied territory of prisoners and deportees.
- (3.) The return to treaty conditions in the Rhineland and the evacuation of the Ruhr.

22. On the 18th and the 19th May the Belgian Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs met the Italian President of the Council at Milan and reported to him the result of their visits to Paris and London. A communiqué issued at the end of the meeting affirmed the desire of the two Governments to see the Dawes Report applied without delay and a conference called for that purpose. The communiqué concluded with a statement that the two Governments recognised that the question of inter-Allied debts belonged to the integral and definite solution of the reparation problem.

23. Meanwhile the Prime Minister on the 9th May had invited M. Poincaré to visit him at Chequers. The French elections, which took place on the 11th May, resulted, however, somewhat unexpectedly in a defeat for M. Poincaré and the *Bloc national* and a victory for the *Bloc des Gauches*. M. Poincaré, therefore, cancelled his visit, but the cancellation gave rise to an exchange of letters with the Prime Minister, the most important of which was a letter, dated the 14th May, in which M. Poincaré affirmed that his Government had accepted, without restriction or reservation, the conclusions of the Dawes Report, and were prepared to re-establish the economic unity of the Reich as soon as Germany had applied the programme laid down by the Reparation Commission (see paragraph 5 above). At the same time he mentioned four points as requiring discussion:—

- (1.) The military, as distinct from the economic, evacuation of the Ruhr, on which the Dawes Report did not touch.
- (2.) The question of reimposing sanctions in the event of German default
- (3.) The question of an arrangement for guaranteeing the safety of the communications of French troops in the occupied area.
- (4.) The question of French security.

24. In a further letter, in answer to an enquiry by the Prime Minister, M. Poincaré stated that nothing stood in the way of further examination with him of these questions, by correspondence or the intermediary of Ambassadors, pending the entry into office of the new French Government, but His Majesty's Government finally decided not to pursue the discussions until a Government came into power which was in a position to take decisions.

25. The change of Government was due to take place on the 1st June, but a fresh crisis arose in France over the question of the Presidency. M. Millerand was widely accused of unconstitutional action, and the state of political feeling compelled M. Herriot, on being requested to form a Government, to decline the task if M. Millerand remained President. A stop-gap Government was formed by M. François Marsal, but this was at once defeated, and its resignation was followed by that of the President himself on the 11th June. On the 13th June M. Doumergue was elected President, and he at once entrusted the formation of a Ministry to M. Herriot. In a declaration of policy on the 17th June the latter proclaimed himself hostile to the policy of isolation and force which led to occupations and the seizure of territorial pledges. He declared that he accepted the Dawes Report without hesitation, but that it was not possible to evacuate the Ruhr before the pledges provided by the Dawes scheme had been constituted with equitable and efficacious guarantees of execution and handed over to the organisations qualified to exploit them. The debate on this declaration terminated on the 20th June with a majority for the new Government, and M. Herriot at once proceeded to England, where he had conversations with the Prime Minister on the 21st and 22nd June at Chequers. In these conversations M. Herriot declared his willingness to begin the economic evacuation of the Ruhr as soon as the Reparation Commission had declared that the control organisations under the Dawes scheme were set up and allowed to function. As regards military evacuation, he was prepared either to make it dependent on the placing with the public of the German bonds under the Dawes scheme or to return to a merely "invisible" occupation, *i.e.*, the occupation of a few essential points only. As regards sanctions, M. Herriot was willing to accept a joint written declaration warning Germany that in case of default she would find herself face to face with the united Allies. He

W.L. Mackenzie King Papers

Memoranda & Notes

**PUBLIC ARCHIVES**  
**ARCHIVES PUBLIQUES**  
**CANADA**