

5. If Colonel Hamilton's report is substantially confirmed, then we might later go on to discuss the implications for U.N. peace-keeping operations, as indicated above.

A.R. MENZIES

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DEA/6386-40

*Note du chef de la Direction des Nations Unies
pour le sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Head, United Nations Division,
to Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY.

[Ottawa], January 9, 1963

Reference: D.L. (1) Division's memorandum of January 8.

UNITED NATIONS ACTION IN KATANGA

The memorandum under reference expresses grave concern about recent events in the Congo and particularly about the ONUC advance on Jadotville apparently without proper authority from New York. The memorandum refers to two messages of January 3 and 4 from the Canadian contingent in the Congo and contained in telegrams DL-9 and DL-10 of January 7. The main concern of D.L. (1) Division is about the breakdown in the chain of command from New York to the troops in the field. The main worry of our military, as revealed in their telegrams, appears to be the chicken-heartedness of the United Nations authorities in New York in failing to exploit military advantage in Katanga.

2. D.L. (1) Division is also concerned about the "precedent" established by these recent events and about their implication on United Nations peace-keeping operations. The suggestion is that we approach the United States authorities for their "account of the facts" and their assessment of implications for the United Nations.

3. If there was a breakdown in communications and command from New York, and I understand that the Secretary-General has admitted this, it is a serious matter. If the Secretary-General's representative, Mr. Gardiner, and his military commanders in the field decided to move against Jadotville in defiance of precise orders from New York, that is also serious. It is important, moreover, that we try to establish the facts of the case in order to decide what should be done to prevent serious breaks in the United Nations chain of command in future peace-keeping operations.

4. I must confess, however, that I do not regard the most recent events as creating any new crisis in United Nations affairs or as establishing any particular precedent in relation to peace-keeping. In my experience, there have been frequent occasions when the situation in field became so confused that the United Nations authorities in New York lost touch with it. This happened from time to time in Lebanon in an operation much similar and much simpler. It has happened before in the Congo. It could happen again there. The reference to events in Korea involving General MacArthur is applicable only in the sense that it demonstrated that even a Great Power like the United States can have breaks in its chain of command, for there can be no doubt that General MacArthur's orders at that time emanated from Washington rather than United Nations Headquarters.

5. I am not condoning what happened in any of these cases. It has been very apparent in the Congo operation that the United Nations can no longer intervene in complicated political situations without great precision in its mandate, without a firm controlling command and without a carefully balanced and integrated military and civilian staff. Moreover, in a situation like that in the Congo, with the troops far flung and communications heavily burdened, there