

5. For all of these objectives the more time we can gain the better. A phased withdrawal would be politically easier for Belgians and would facilitate the practical side of the UN operations. On the question of unity, Tshombe is showing some disposition to modify his claim for complete independence in favour of a new deal for the provinces and time is needed to encourage this tendency, to find a basis for a rapprochement and to establish the authority of Congolese leaders with whom he would have to negotiate.

6. Above all time is needed for the most difficult of the problems. The building up of a cadre of advisers and technicians. These would have a better chance of succeeding if they could work for some time while the UN troops are still there.

[SYDNEY] PIERCE

10.

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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures
pour le secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*

*Memorandum from Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

SECRET

[Ottawa], July 27, 1960

UNITED NATIONS OPERATIONS IN THE CONGO

During the past few weeks, while the situation in the Congo and events at the United Nations have been developing so swiftly, we have had little opportunity to assess the extent and significance of these developments but it does seem worthwhile now to make some comment on them, especially about the role of the United Nations in the Congo. You are already aware that the Secretary-General is following a three-point programme, involving an emergency stopgap arrangement for meeting the disturbed situation in the Congo, a crash programme of supply and distribution to meet the food shortage, and a longer term programme of technical assistance designed to rebuild the administrative services of the Congolese Government. In addition to these practical steps but very closely related to them, the Secretary-General, acting himself or through his representatives in Leopoldville, is engaged in detailed negotiations, mainly with the Government of Belgium but also involving other governments, for implementing the United Nations programme in the Congo.

Extent

2. The complexity of the problems facing the United Nations is enormous. Already the United Nations military Force in the Congo is almost double the size of UNEF; the national contingents are drawn from member states with much less experience than those who provided contingents for UNEF; there is a language problem which adds greatly to the difficulties of administering a mixed Force; and, of course, the geographical area to be covered by the Force is immense, aggravating the problems of communications, transportation and supply.

3. While the Force has been effective in the early days of its establishment in moving into areas of disturbance and replacing both the Belgian troops and the Force Publique as the means of maintaining law and order, in a very short time the United Nations Force may find itself in serious administrative difficulty. Strenuous efforts are being made to organize a command headquarters at Leopoldville and sub-commands in other principal locations but quite obviously the time will soon arrive when emergency arrangements will have to be replaced by an orderly system, especially as regards communications and logistic support. The likelihood is that the various battalions arriving in the Congo were provided with sufficient supplies and equipment to enable them to operate for a short time without logistic support but the need for