

### *The Asantehene*

43. Both the Asantehene's position and his attitude towards Ashanti are equivocal. He is the Paramount Chief of the Ashanti and therefore, through the strange mixture of heredity and election whereby the "stool" or symbol of chieftainship is transferred, is a strong paternalistic and feudal overlord of almost a million Ghanaians. Being a chief, he has kept in the background and his behaviour has been technically correct; but there is no doubt that he has looked with disfavour upon Nkrumah as an upstart and that he regards the pace of development as far too rapid. It was his influence in the Asanteman Council of chiefs which made it essential that the safeguards mentioned in paragraph 11 above should be inserted in the Constitution. The Chief Regional Officer for Kumasi, who has been his United Kingdom adviser, will presumably retire following Independence. It remains to be seen whether his other advisers, who include such mercurial and evasive personalities as Joe Appiah will be as responsible. It is here, rather than in the Northern Territories that both the opportunity and the need for statesmanship are greatest. The Asantehene is sixty-five; provided he were left with the symbols and trappings of power, he might be willing to compromise with Nkrumah.

### *Problems for the West*

44. Politically the next six to eight months will be critical in Ghana. It is during this period that the separatist difficulties with the Ashanti and the Ewes must progress toward a solution and that the attitude of the government toward either a stern attack on economic tasks, or the pursuit of nationalist and Pan African will-o-the-wisps will become evident. On the whole, the experience of the Canadian party leads us to believe that the former course is the more likely (granted the personalities of Nkrumah and Gbedemah) provided that the West does not hold aloof in any spirit of implied censure. If this happened, the rewards would be reaped by irresponsible left-wing malcontents in Ghana and by the Soviets abroad. Further, the example which Ghana can give to other emergent African countries would be seriously impaired. As an index of increasing responsibility and also of the tremendous hold which Nkrumah has over the masses, one may note that the famous political slogan, *S.G. NOW*, which was chanted effectively throughout Ghana during the period 1951-56 has been given a new content. Nkrumah announced a few weeks ago that, as self-government was about to be achieved, *S.G. NOW* would henceforth mean not "self-government now" but "serve Ghana now". The new emotional content of the phrase has kindled great enthusiasm among the masses. If Nkrumah tells them to "serve Ghana now" and if, as a result of doing so they see tangible rewards, then the future of Ghana is unclouded.

### *A Canadian Policy Toward Ghana*

45. It is suggested that Canadian interests might best be served by the following steps:

- (1) The opening of a diplomatic mission in Ghana, under a High Commissioner, September 1957 would not be too soon.
- (2) One of the main tasks of this mission would be to aid the flow of technical assistance from Canada to Ghana, principally in such fields as: civil service administration; social welfare work; economics; experts in external affairs and manpower selection; highway engineers; forestry experts. (These tentative suggestions are subject to confirmation or otherwise by Dr. Ault's report).
- (3) Our technical assistance could continue to flow through UNTAB, but funds should be made available to have assistance also extended bilaterally.