

demands of international conferences, as well as the implications of Canada's involvement in the North Atlantic Treaty, justified additional personnel, but Treasury Board displayed a greater disposition to challenge and query that expansion, "particularly at a time when efforts were being made to reduce the size of the Civil Service" (Document 4). With the exception of three immigration offices in Europe, the only new posts opened in 1949 were a Mission in Bonn and a Consulate General in Milan. As the Annual Report ruefully observed, "the past year has marked the close of a period of rapid expansion of Canadian representation abroad."<sup>4</sup> In some contexts, such as the Council of Foreign Ministers, Canada remained highly dependent on its senior allies for information. As Georges Vanier observed (Document 30), that was often more readily available from Britain and France than from the United States.

That question of information, and particularly the dependence of Canada on sympathetic countries to supplement its own limited sources, arose most acutely during Canada's term on the Security Council of the United Nations. The documentation printed in this volume on questions which arose at the United Nations merely suggests the importance assigned and the attention devoted to these subjects by Canadian diplomats and ministers. However, it does convey the remarkable range of disputes which came before the international organization and upon which Canada was expected to define and articulate a position. In some instances, such as Palestine and Kashmir, Canada's membership in the Commonwealth complicated its response as it endeavoured, with others, to seek solutions to seemingly intractable problems and to avoid open conflicts between countries with whom Canada was anxious to promote good relations.

More commonly, Canada's alignment in the Cold War, formalized by its participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, determined or tempered its reaction to events. That factor is especially important to understanding Canada's efforts to help an ally, the Netherlands, to extricate itself from an impossible position in Indonesia, without alienating opinion in Asia, particularly the government of India (Documents 110, 150 and 151). That dilemma, as well as the need to develop Canadian policy in an unfamiliar part of Asia, accounts for the extensive documentation on this question in this volume. In fact, Canada viewed most issues which came before the Security Council through the prism of the Cold War. That perspective strongly influenced its support for India's candidacy for the "Commonwealth seat" as a non-permanent member of the Security Council, which Canada would vacate at the end of the year, as well as its preference for Yugoslavia over Czechoslovakia as the representative of Eastern Europe (Documents 53 to 55). This emphasis should not be surprising, as the biases of the Cold War permeated Canada's international relations.

Though the division of the world along ideological and strategic lines certainly limited Canada's options in external affairs, Canada's unambiguous position in the

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<sup>4</sup>*Report, 1949*, p. 77; *Royal Commission on Conditions of Foreign Service* (Ottawa, 1981), pp. 100-101. Even so, the number of officers grew by over 10%, while the overall size of the Department grew by under 4%. One consequence of Newfoundland's entry into Confederation was that it eliminated the need for diplomatic representation in St. John's.