

this positive advice from *Paris*, dated *May* 6th.
 " The *Brest* fleet set sail very early on the 3d,
 " with so fair a wind, as to be out of sight in
 " a short time. It is generally believed, that
 " *Macnamara's* orders are *only* to convoy the
 " ships that serve as transports, to a certain
 " distance, and then to let them pursue their
 " voyage without him *."

By these advices it is evident, *Great Britain* had nothing to fear from an invasion into either of its kingdoms: and that, notwithstanding *France* had a few more ships in the ports of *Brest* and *Rockfort* fit for service, they had neither sailors, provisions, ordnance, nor ammunition, to fit them out for sea; nor any number of vessels, capable of transporting an army into this island; had it ever so seriously meditated a descent in favour of the Pretender *. Why then

* This was confirmed by the return of M. *Macnamara* on *May* 20th, with *nine* ships of the line, having convoyed the transports beyond the capes, and left them to proceed to *Canada* with a fair wind. *May* 20th captain *Innis*, *Otter sloop*, at sea, saw nine sail of *French* men of war off *Ushant* going into *Brest*. *May* 23d captain *Edwards*, *Dispatch*, off *Falmouth*, saw twenty-five sail on the 4th, viz. twenty line of battle, two of 50, and three frigates, which came out of *Brest* and separated. The *French* admiral with eight sail hauled their wind. See advices to *Admiralty office*.

* The only intelligence, upon which the ministry could form any idea of an invasion at this time, being the letters of Mr. *Barnham* from *Dover* to Mr. *Amyand*, I shall add their contents.

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