

ment setting the stage for the next round of negotiations.

– SALT should seek not only restraints but also substantially-reduced ceilings on strategic nuclear weapons.

– SALT should seek not only quantitative limitations and reductions but also far-reaching limitations and prohibitions on qualitative improvements and innovations in such weaponry.

– Agreements must be verifiable and thus give assurance they will be observed.

– We understand that a ban on the flight-testing of strategic delivery vehicles can be verified by national technical means and thus may be one useful and feasible way to seek to curtail the qualitative aspects of the arms race.

– With those thoughts in mind, my delegation fully supported the language of Paragraphs 50 and 52 of the final document of the special session on disarmament, with their emphasis on both qualitative and quantitative limitations. We also supported Resolution 32/87G adopted by the thirty-second session of the General Assembly and we continue to do so.

**Comprehensive  
Test  
Ban**

I wish to repeat here the views of my Government on the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), which was the first of the four points outlined by my Prime Minister in his "strategy of suffocation" to arrest the dynamic of the nuclear-arms race:

– A treaty prohibition of nuclear tests, with effective verification to provide adequate assurance of compliance, would be an additional qualitative restraint on the nuclear-weapons development process and thus have an impact on vertical proliferation.

– As a multilateral treaty to which non-nuclear-weapons states as well as nuclear-weapons states might adhere, it would also have value in reinforcing the international system to prevent horizontal proliferation.

– Canada believes that a comprehensive test ban should be pursued as a matter of urgency, as stipulated in Paragraph 51 of the final document of the special session. We understand that the negotiations now being pursued by the U.S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. are close to conclusion and we can look forward to early consideration of the results in the Committee on Disarmament.

**Cessation of  
the production  
of fissionable  
material**

On many occasions, and most recently during the special session, Canada and many other states have drawn attention to the fact that agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes would also contribute to the ending of the nuclear-arms race. We welcome the explicit recognition of this approach in Paragraph 50 of the final document of the special session on disarmament. Obviously, as is the case with many other measures in the disarmament field, the usefulness of such an agreement would depend on the application of effective verification measures, which, in this instance, should include acceptance of full-scope or comprehensive safeguards under the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) or some equivalent system.

The objective, in our opinion, should be the elaboration by the Committee on Disarmament of a multilateral treaty, to which both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon states might adhere, prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons

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