

1. INTRODUCTION

The signing, in January 1989, of the Concluding Document of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe was heralded as a milestone in East-West relations. The Vienna Concluding Document launched two sets of arms control negotiations -- one on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs), involving all CSCE participating states, and a second¹ on the reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE), involving NATO and Warsaw Pact members -- and established a procedure that enabled participating states to question each other about their human rights practices. This was no small achievement for a body composed of 35 states sprawled across three continents, embodying a range of democratic and totalitarian governments and divided, for the most part, into two ideologically- and militarily-opposed blocs, taking decisions under a rule requiring consensus. It was a far cry from the first CSCE document of some 14 years previous, in which arms control negotiations had deliberately been established completely apart from the CSCE and the very mention of minority rights was denounced as interference in states' internal affairs.

Yet even with the Vienna Concluding Document the CSCE was still more the froth than the broth of security deliberations in Europe. To the West, the CSCE served primarily as a forum for criticizing the East's human rights record. Although viewed as helpful in promoting contacts and confidence between East and West, the CSCE was neither expected nor designed to deal with inter-state conflict. Even in the CFE negotiations, the alliances were to be the main players. The CSCE remained a gypsy, existing from meeting to meeting with no fixed address or long-term schedule. The leaders of participating states had not met as a group since 1975 -- an indication of the priority accorded to the CSCE by its constituent governments.

How much more remarkable, then, that in the five years since 1989, the CSCE has acquired a permanent secretariat, parliamentary assembly and centres for conflict resolution and democratic development, become host to a group of ambassadors in permanent session, and held two summits and numerous foreign ministers' meetings at which the most pressing European security issues have been the staple of discussion. The CSCE is the focal point for European arms control negotiations, deploys missions in half a dozen [Eurasian] hot spots, and ^{operat with} [sports] procedures ^{conf. prevention} for crisis management and conflict resolution that include the authority to ^{has} dispatch peacekeeping forces to anywhere within CSCE territory. And all this has been arrived at through the consensus of participating states, whose number has burgeoned to 53. ^{a framework}

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What follows is a study of Canada's contribution to this prodigious institutional development, particularly in the area of conflict prevention and management. There are several reasons why such a study is worth conducting. First, the years since 1989 have been an extraordinary period for the CSCE, as it has tried to move from being a tool for the peaceful transformation of Europe to one for managing the effects of that transformation. The CSCE now offers the most extensive array of conflict management mechanisms of any regional grouping in the world. Whatever the future may hold for the CSCE, it is interesting

¹As an autonomous conference within the CSCE framework.