

- revising those paragraphs of NATO's Strategic Concept dealing with nuclear policy, more specifically: eliminating references to the political value ascribed to nuclear weapons
- advancing a broader disarmament agenda
- developing further NATO's role as a consultative body and a diplomatic actor
- engaging Russia in discussions about non-proliferation and disarmament through the Permanent Joint Council (PJC).

While modest improvements to the language on nuclear policy were made, Canada did not receive support for significant changes to the nuclear paragraphs. Canada did obtain a commitment to consider options for confidence and security building measures, verification, non-proliferation and arms control, as well as disarmament. A commitment was also made to deepen consultations with Russia. Later that year in Brussels (December 1999) it was decided to task the Senior Political Committee to *review* Alliance policy options so that a comprehensive and integrated approach to the agreements made at the Washington Summit is ensured. During the NATO Foreign Ministers meeting in Florence (May 2000), a Canadian-drawn *outline of a final report on the review* expected in December 2000 was accepted. It was also in Florence, where Minister Axworthy appealed to make NATO's nuclear policy consistent with the NPT. NATO's commitment to a review process was a big step forward.

Canadians continue to provide substantive contributions to the final report through the work of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre (WMD) at NATO. The aim of the Centre is to improve information and intelligence-sharing among member states on proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. It should also help promote more active consultation and co-operation among the Allies. The final report may point to NATO's accomplishments since 1991 (i.e., practical partnerships and seminars on small arms and light weapons, work on land mines, and the establishment of the WMD Centre), NATO's outreach programmes with Russia and others (i.e., Ukraine, Egypt, Israel) on non-proliferation issues, Confidence and Security Building Measures (CSBMs), negative security assurances, threat reduction in Russia, involvement of parties outside NATO, Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), and other issues.

While the procedural environment in which NATO operates is frustrating and tedious, modest (formal) progress often means tangible results. Getting something in December would be better than nothing. The United States will most likely press for more time to consult the new administration. Moreover, Canadian initiatives on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation will have to compete with other items on NATO's agenda. Canada must continue to play a constructive role in addressing these as well as other issues.

The debate in NATO could likely move forward in these areas:

- identification of issues (language) where NATO policy should be brought in line with the NPT Review Conference's Final Document
- discussions in NATO and later with the Russian government on sub-strategic weapons
- identification of further steps aimed at increasing transparency and confidence between