

in advanced bomber technology, and that bombers have not been a priority weapons system in the development of their strategic forces.

Just as in earlier American proposals, therefore, they are likely to resist a formula which impels them to a production programme - a modernized 350 bomber force - incompatible with their own priorities and technological advantage. A negotiation which permitted freedom to trade between bombers and certain kinds of ballistic missiles might well be attractive to the Soviets, and compatible with the American position on bomber forces.

Longer-Range Theatre Nuclear Forces

The US proposes that each side restrict themselves to 140 missile launchers in the European theatre. In the American case this number would be achieved through the deployment of 32 GLCM batteries (4 missiles per battery) and 108 Pershing IIs, for a total of 236 warheads. The Soviets would be allowed to deploy 140 SS-20s (three warheads per missile), for a total of 420 warheads. Perhaps implicit in this calculation is recognition of the British and French nuclear forces, which would add 386 warheads to the Western aggregate. On the other hand, the US proposal excludes all land-based and carrier aircraft. It is therefore significantly less comprehensive than the Soviet proposal, which integrates all LRTNF with long-range strategic forces. Since that proposal in turn is clearly unacceptable to the Americans, LRTNF negotiations, as the most recent American response indicates,³² involve trade-offs of great political and military complexity.

³²In their response of February 24 to the Soviet proposal on INF, the US offered a three-year plan. In the first year, both sides would reduce to 140 launchers as described above, while the Soviet Union would also proportionately reduce their Asian-based SS-20s. A number of other conditions were added, however, which suggest that the US wishes to place the negotiations in broader political context.