

community at large benefitted from these actions, but except for the great powers, the other members of the community were not consulted. For effective -- and legitimate -- action today, CSCE members need to consider various formulas for delegating authority in certain situations and for controlling the policies of those who act in the name of the community.

The rule of consensus also needs to be modified. It could be retained for most issues on the CSCE agenda (e.g., arms control and disarmament, CSBMs, and the like), but waived where the actions of one or more states, or non-state actors, were deemed by the Council of Foreign Ministers or Committee of Senior Officials (or a significant majority therein) to constitute a threat to the community as a whole. Space does not permit a detailed examination of the many possibilities. Here it is sufficient to underline how the conflicting principles incorporated into the CSCE are likely to limit the role of its new institutions in controlling or resolving the kinds of conflicts that are likely to appear in the new Europe. If the CSCE is to avoid becoming marginalized as an instrument of conflict resolution, it will need to undertake a careful examination of its own rules.

The CSCE has some important fundamentals. It is the only organization that represents all of Europe. Unlike NATO, it cannot be perceived by anyone as a threat, or as irrelevant. Yet, it is the EC that seems to be appropriating the conflict resolution role in Europe. In some ways it is better equipped to act effectively than is the CSCE, but it suffers from the limitation of representing less than one-third of Europe's countries, and does not include Canadian or American participation. It also lacks some elements of authority and legitimacy that the CSCE possesses. But the CSCE in its present stage lacks capabilities, experience, and the constraints of unanimity and incompatible principles in its main texts. In its handling of human rights and national minority problems -- significant sources of international conflict -- it has moved vigorously to undermine the most conservative aspects of the sovereignty principle. In the area of conflict resolution, however, the Valletta documents demonstrate strong resistance to innovation, and the continued sanctity of voluntarism, consensus rule, and the sovereign equality of states.