On peacemaking -- the use of good offices, mediation and diplomacy to resolve disputes -- the brief called for better coordination and integration of the efforts of the various UN and regional agencies with peacemaking experience and capabilities. It also encouraged a broad approach to peacemaking which would include non-military threats stemming from economic, social, humanitarian and ecological causes. Specifically, it called for a stand-by pool of qualified personnel in the fields of electoral assistance, human rights and civil administration.

In regard to peacekeeping, the brief urged consideration of ways to permit the early deployment of peacekeeping forces in support of peacemaking, and as a deterrent to potential armed conflicts. Calling for greater coordination and integration within the Secretariat of those departments concerned with peacekeeping, the brief also recognized the burden imposed by the growing number of peacekeeping operations, and suggested that national personnel should be recruited on an ad hoc basis to assist the work of the Secretariat. Finally, the brief stressed the need for a sound financial basis for peacekeeping operations. In addition to increasing pressure on delinquent member states to pay their peacekeeping assessments, the brief called for a peacekeeping reserve fund to ensure that the start-up phase of peacekeeping operations can proceed promptly.

Many of these ideas were reflected in the Secretary-General's report. A further response to the report, perhaps also issued collectively by the Nordic/CANZ group, was expected in time for the fall 1992 session of the UN General Assembly.

PARLIAMENTARY COMMENT

On 14 August 1991, writing in the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, Liberal foreign affairs critic Lloyd Axworthy called for a Charter review conference to consider "the many ideas for strengthening the UN as the world ponders the lessons of the Gulf." Axworthy wrote:

The power structure embodied in the Security Council and the veto power held by its five permanent members are anachronistic at best....The charter's hands-off approach to "internal" disputes -- and the resulting inability of the UN to respond effectively to the slaughter of Iraqi Kurds and Shiites at the war's end -- reflects a perception of the prerogatives of national sovereignty that does not fit our growing interdependence.