

secondly, by pointing to remarkable feats of instincts in the lower animals and to characteristics in the world which he maintains can be apprehended by intuition while they remain baffling to intellect (as he understands it). Bergson evidently assumes at times that intelligence is obliged to follow exclusively the law of identity.

In agreement with some biologists and physicists who make occasional excursions into the field of philosophy, M. Bergson holds that intelligence is a purely practical faculty which has been developed in the course of the struggle for survival and hence cannot be a source of truth. It is thus assumed, without any evidence, that a historical growth and biological origin are necessarily incompatible with epistemological validity and value. The burden of proof rests with the assertors, who appear to overlook the fact that it is only through the decried intelligence that we know of or can formulate any theory of the biological ancestry of man. If the intellect is misleading (a will o' the wisp or a "Zauberlaterne," as Schopenhauer said) the whole of this and kindred theories, including Bergson's criticism of science, are presumably groundless. As a matter of fact, capacity for this kind of knowledge and for epistemology generally is not more difficult to explain on received biological theories of origin than is capacity for pure mathematics. Neither M. Bergson nor anybody else is able to show that the latter science is illusory.

In man, intuition or instinct is seen at its best in regard to other people's characters and dispositions, that is to say, where it is directly useful. Here it sometimes acts with astonishing rapidity and effectiveness. The most striking instances which Bergson, like Schopenhauer, brings forward from the life of the lower animals all bear directly on survival value. Now, of course, intellect has also a survival value; both instinct and intelligence, which are not wholly distinct in origin (apart from the minds of certain *a priori* and spiritualistic philosophers who pay little heed to the teachings of comparative psychology), have generally speaking been developed because useful, and they are useful because, and in so far as, they are in accord