

and it did not require the color staff to indicate their presence. I have heard that one regiment did take its colors into the field. There was a great desire evinced by some few of the men to "tail off" to the rear, under pretence of carrying the wounded, although such presence is strictly provided for by the articles of war. One officer was killed by a shot while running after some of his men to restrain them from getting away. I saw myself six and eight men at a time carrying off a litter with one man in it. Our ambulances were soon filled, and ere nine o'clock they were busily engaged in carrying loads of men, all covered with blood, and groaning, to the rear of the line.

About half-past nine o'clock, Lord Raglan and his staff were assembled on a knoll, in the rain hope of getting a glimpse of the battle which was raging below them. Here General Strangways was mortally wounded, and I am told he met his death in the following way:—A shell came right in among the staff; it exploded under Capt. Somerset's horse, ripping him open, a portion of the shell tore off the leather overalls of Capt. Somerset's trousers; it then struck down Capt. Gordon's horse and killed him at once, and then blew away General Strangways's leg, so that it hung by a shred of flesh and a bit of cloth from the skin. The poor old general never moved a muscle of his face. He said, merely in a gentle voice, "will any one be kind enough to lift me off my horse?" He was taken and laid on the ground, while his life blood ebbed fast, and at last he was carried to the rear; but the gallant old man had not sufficient strength to undergo an operation, and ere two hours he had sunk to rest, leaving behind him a memory which will ever be held dear by every officer and man of the army.

The fight about the battery to which I have alluded in a former part of my letter was most sanguinary. It was found that there was no banquet to stand upon, and that the men inside could not fire upon the enemy. The Russians advanced mass after mass of infantry. As fast as one column was broken and repulsed, another took its place. For three long hours about 8500 British infantry contended against at least four times their number. No wonder that at times they were compelled to retire. But they came to the charge again. The admirable devotion of the officers, who knew they were "special objects of attack," can never be too highly praised. Nor can the courage and steadiness of the few men who were left to follow them in this sanguinary assault on the enemy be sufficiently admired. At one time the Russians succeeded in getting up close to the guns of Captain Wodehouse's and of Captain Turner's batteries in the gloom of the morning. Uncertain whether they were friends or foes, our artillerymen hesitated to fire. The Russians charged them suddenly, bore all resistance down before them, drove away or bayoneted the gunners, and succeeded in spiking some of the guns! Their columns gained the hill, and for a few instants the fate of the day trembled in the balance; but Adam's Brigade, Pennefather's Brigade, and the Light Division made another desperate charge, while Dickson's guns swept their columns, and the Guards, with undiminished valor and steadiness, though with a sadly decreased front, pushed on again to meet their bitter enemies. The rolling of musketry, the crash of steel, the pounding of the guns, were deafening, and the Russians as they charged up the heights yelled like demons. They advanced, halted, and advanced again, received, and returned a close and deadly fire; but the Minié is the king of weapons. Inkermann proved it. The regiments of the 4th Division and the Marines, armed with the old and much-belauded Brown Bess, could do nothing with their thin line of fire against the massive multitudes of the Muscovite infantry; but the volleys of the Minié cleft them like the hand of the destroying Angel, and they fell like leaves in autumn before them. About ten o'clock a body of French infantry appeared on our right, a joyful sight to our struggling regiments. The Zouaves came on at the *pas de charge*. The French artillery had already begun to play with deadly effect on the right wing of the Russians. Three battalions of the Chasseurs d'Orléans, [I believe they had No. 6 on their buttons,] rushed by, the light of battle on their faces. They were accompanied by a battalion of Chasseurs Indigènes, the Arab speys of Algiers. Their trumpets sounded above the din of battle, and when we watched their eager advance right on the flank of the enemy, we knew the day was won. Assaulted in front by our men, and broken in several places by the impetuosity of our charge, renewed again and again, attacked by the French infantry on the right, and by artillery all along the line, the Russians began to retire; and at twelve o'clock they were driven pell-mell down the hill, towards the valley, where pursuit would have been madness, as the roads were all covered by their artillery. They left mounds of dead behind them. Long ere they fled the Chasseurs d'Africa charged them most brilliantly over the ground, difficult and broken as it was, and inflicted great loss on them, while the effect of this rapid attack, aided by the advance of our troops, secured our guns, which were only spiked with wood, and were soon rendered fit for service. Our own cavalry, the remnant of the Light Brigade, were moved into a position where it was hoped they might be of service; but they were too few to attempt anything, and whilst they were drawn up, they lost several horses and some men. One officer, Cornet Cleveland, was struck by a piece of shell in the side and has since expired. There are now only two officers left with the fragment of the 17th Lancers—Capt. Godfrey Morgan and Cornet George Wombwell. At 12 o'clock, the battle of Inkermann seemed to have been won; but the day which had cleared up for an hour previously so as to enable us to see the enemy and meet him, again became obscured. Rain and fog again set in, and as we could not pursue the Russians, who were retiring

under the shelter of their artillery, we had formed in front of our lines, and were holding the battle-field so stoutly contested, when the enemy, taking advantage of our quietude, again advanced, while their guns pushed forward and opened a tremendous fire upon us. Gen. Canrobert, who never quitted Lord Raglan for much of the early part of the day, at once ordered the French to advance and outflank the enemy. In his effort he was most ably seconded by Gen. Bosquet, whose devotion was noble. Nearly all his mounted escort were down beside and behind him. Gen. Canrobert was slightly wounded. His immediate attendants suffered severely. The renewed assault was so admirably managed that the Russians sullenly retired, still protected by their crushing artillery.

The Russians, about 10, made a sortie on the French lines, and transversed two parallels before they could be resisted. They were driven back at last, with great loss, and as they retired they blew up some mines inside the Flagstaff Fort, evidently afraid that the French would enter pell-mell after them.

At 1 o'clock the Russians were again retiring. At 1:40 Dickson's two guns smashed up their artillery, and they limbered up, leaving five tumbrils and one gun-carriage on the field. Nov. 6.—200 Russian prisoners were brought in last night to head-quarters camp. They were badly wounded many of them, and several died during the night. A council was held to-day at Lord Raglan's, where Gen. Canrobert, Gen. Bosquet, and Sir E. Lyons assisted for several hours.

At four o'clock Lord Raglan attended the funerals of Generals Sir George Cathcart, of Brigadier Goldie, and of General Strangways. They were buried with 11 other officers on Cathcart's Hill. At the same time 14 officers of the Guards were buried together near the windmill. The work of burying the dead and carrying the wounded to Balaklava occupied the day. The Russians are quiet. We hear they have lost 10,000 men and three generals.

Nov. 7.—A council of war was held to-day, at the close of which the Duke of Cambridge left for Balaklava, and went on board the *Caradoc*. His Royal highness is, it is said, going to Constantinople. It is said we wait here all the winter.

The 46th regiment have arrived here, also 1700 Turks from Volo, and 2800 French. The Russians fired on our burying parties. There was an alarm last night. The 4th Division were under arms all night, and a portion of the 2nd Division.

I have no time to add more. We must have men at once—and abundance of them.

#### PROSPECTS OF THE SIEGE.

By this time a tolerably correct idea must have been obtained respecting our operations in the Crimea and the position of the allied armies before Sebastopol. We are not simply engaged in the siege of a town on the ordinary terms of such an enterprise; we are confronting from an entrenched camp of our own, an entrenched camp of the Russians, resting on Sebastopol, and we are endeavoring, by the aid of our artillery, so to subdue the fire of the enemy as to render the assault of his works a practicable operation. Whether, however, the forcing of the Russian lines and the defeat of their army to the south of the town will also bring about the actual capture of the place appears uncertain, for behind the fieldworks, now defended with such tenacity, lie streets, in which every house is said to have been converted into a castle, and on the other side of the harbor stand forts and batteries which may turn their fire upon the town as soon as it falls into our hands. Sebastopol, in short, resembles in some sort those vessels constructed with several compartments, each distinct and watertight in itself, so that on the occurrence of accident the sea may rush into one part of the ship and yet find no entrance to the others. The fortress occupies the two shores of an inlet running east and west. On the left, or northern shore, of this inlet, are batteries of extraordinary solidity and power for the protection of the harbor. On the opposite shore stands the town itself. This, however, is again divided by a second and smaller inlet running at right angles to the principal harbor, and separating the dockyards and arsenals on its eastern side from the ordinary town buildings on the western. The former of these divisions is at present menaced by the British, the latter by the French, but it is possible that one may be taken without the other, while the batteries to the north of the harbor are independent of both. It is difficult therefore to compute the results of a regular assault on the part of the allies, for, as the garrison outnumbers the besieging force, and the town is open, the Russians will not be in the position of men captured in their stronghold, but may defend one district of the place after another, or retire into the interior of the country, and afterwards reappear before the walls as besiegers in their turn. In ordinary cases, when a town is taken the garrison is taken too; and every fighting man in the place becomes a prisoner of war; but the Russians in Sebastopol are just as free to retreat from their position as the Russians on the Alma, and can exercise their own discretion about the continuation of the campaign.

The extraordinary character of the difficulties attending our present operations before Sebastopol is not likely to be fully appreciated without some insight into the nature of siege undertakings in general. In the present age it is received as a maxim by military engineers that the means of attack are superior to the means of defence; or, in other words, that if any fortified place, however strong, is attacked according to rule by a proper force of men and guns it must inevitably fall within a certain time unless preserved by some rare and singular advantage. Now, as the allied armies were disembarked on the shores of the

Crimea in strength sufficient to conquer the enemy in a pitched battle, and as they have now for some weeks been besieging Sebastopol with a most powerful force of artillery, directed by some of the best engineers in the world, it may be asked, what circumstances have retarded their success, or why the place was not sooner taken? To this inquiry we subjoin an explanatory reply.

When a siege is undertaken, the first operation is what is called the "investment" of the town—that is to say, the town is surrounded on all sides by posts of the besieging army, so that no ingress or egress is any longer practicable. This is not only the first step, but it is that on which all succeeding steps more or less depend; for the superiority of the attack to the defence arises from the fact that, whereas the means are unlimited in the former case, they are limited in the latter. When a town has been invested, and thus cut off from all communication with the adjacent country, its resources in men, munitions, and provisions become at once confined to the stocks then actually within its walls, while the besiegers, on the other hand, being presumptively masters of the country, can make exactly such dispositions as they think proper. If they cease to be masters of the country—that is to say, if a superior force of the enemy approaches from without, the siege must, in ordinary cases, be raised, and the town is relieved accordingly. Supposing, however, the necessary superiority to reside, at all events for the time, with the besiegers, they then select that point in the defences of the place which appears most favorable for their operations, and here the advantage of the attack over the defence becomes instantly apparent. Whatever may be the strength of the place in respect of artillery, it is obvious that only a certain number of guns can be brought to the defence of a certain portion of the ramparts, whereas the attacking force can concentrate upon this one point all the guns at their disposal. The defences of a town may mount 500 guns; but, if any particular front mounts only 50, and the besiegers can attack this front with twice the number, they have the superiority of fire at the only point where such superiority is required. It is on this condition of operations, joined to the necessary limitation of resources in a place entirely excluded from all external communications, that the ascendancy of the besiegers depends. Availing themselves of the protection derivable from trenches and covered ways, they gradually push their batteries so close to the place that a breach is made in its walls, and as they are always presumed to exceed the garrison greatly in numerical strength, they rush in and carry the town by storm as soon as its defences have been beaten down. It is considered that a town containing a garrison of 15,000 men requires an army of 75,000 men to besiege it, and when, therefore, the smaller force has lost the artificial protection of its ramparts the contest seldom remains doubtful.

If these observations are applied to the case of Sebastopol, it will at once appear that none of the assumed advantages of a besieging force are there to be found. Sebastopol is not invested. The peculiar position of the town, combined with the limited strength of the allied armies, rendered it impossible so to surround the place as to cut off its communications with the interior, and the north side is left completely open. The consequence is that there has been no limitation of resources on the part of the besieged; on the contrary, it is rather the besieging army which has stood in this predicament; for, whereas the allied forces have been gradually diminished by the casualties incidental to their operations, the garrison has received repeated accessions of strength from without. Provisions, too, and munitions of war may have been imported with equal facility, though so extraordinary, in this respect, were the resources of Sebastopol itself that few additions could have been required.

It is next to be remarked that the Russians at Sebastopol are by no means in the position of a garrison inferior in numbers to the attacking force, but relying upon the protection of artificial defences, against which the besiegers advance. They are encamped to the south of the town in very strong intrenchments, which are armed, as Lord Raglan's despatch observes, "with an apparently unlimited number of heavy guns, amply provided with gunners and ammunition." They have raised batteries against our batteries, and earthworks against our earthworks; they return shot for shot, and so far were we from establishing an advantage in this respect, that on the second day of the cannonade their fire was superior to our own. Their front of defence, instead of representing a confined space, exposed to all the concentrated fire of the attack, is actually, as Lord Raglan describes it, "more extended" than our own, and they, the besieged force, are thus in the possession of the advantages ordinarily enjoyed by the besiegers.

In point of fact, there would really be little exaggeration in saying that one of the armies in the Crimea is as effectually "besieged" as the other. Both have their communications open, the Russians by land and the allies by sea; both have their strong positions, the Russians before Sebastopol, the allies on the heights of Balaklava; and, as far as operations have hitherto proceeded, it would be hard to say which party seemed to be the assailants and which the defenders. We are battering the works of the Russians, but they are also battering ours, and whereas we have not yet regularly assaulted their lines, they have attacked ours in such force as to occasion most sanguinary conflicts. The enterprise, in short, is not a siege, but a campaign. We have effected a lodgment on Russian territory, and we are encountering the armies which the Russians bring successively against us. One army representing the garrison of Sebastopol, is encamped under its walls behind earthworks like our own, and is stronger than we are in artillery. Another is posted on our flank or rear, and has made at least one attempt on our position.

Fortunately, although we want many of the advantages of besiegers, we are not without some of the advantages of the opposite kind; for such is the strength of our position in this angle of the Russian territory that we are enabled to repulse the attacks of an enemy numerically superior to ourselves. So far, therefore, although the actual siege of Sebastopol may have advanced but slowly, the events of the campaign are favorable to us. As besiegers we have been retarded in our progress by the non-investment of the town, by the intrenchments thrown up before its walls, by the constant reinforcements received by the garrison, and by the presence of a strong relieving army in the field. But we have maintained our footing on Russian ground, we have beaten the Russians thoroughly whenever they have attacked us, we have already half ruined the fleet and arsenals which gave Sebastopol its importance, and we have fairly established our superiority in all respects; but that of numbers. What remains, therefore, but to approximate, as we can do, to an equality with our antagonist in this respect also, and to despatch those reinforcements which our victorious, though overtaken army, requires? This done, the advantages as well as the honors of the campaign will belong, we may confidently hope, to the Allied Powers.

#### IRISH INTELLIGENCE.

**THE MILITIA.**—The City of Limerick Militia is fast filling up, and the requisite number of 300 will before long be enrolled. Arrangements appear to be at length in course of being carried out for enrolling and embodying the Kilkenny Militia. The contingent which Down furnishes to the 30,000 men of which the Irish militia will consist is 1,472, and this force is divided into two regiments—the Royal North Down Rifles (800 strong), of which the Marquis of Londonderry, lieutenant of the county, is colonel, and the Royal South Down Regiment, 672 strong, of which the Marquis of Downshire is colonel. The Marquis of Londonderry has already nominated Major Montgomery, late of the 45th Regiment, as lieutenant-colonel, and Captain Stewart, late of the Essex Rifles, as adjutant of the Royal North Down Rifles, and has referred to Lord Downshire, as colonel of the South Down Regiment, the selection of the officers of that regiment. It is the intention of the Government to direct the immediate enrolment of the two militia regiments of the county of Mayo; accordingly the adjutants of the regiments have been filled by the Earl of Arran, the noble Lord having appointed Captain Bouchier, late of the 12th Foot, to the South Mayo, and Captain Butler, to the North Mayo. The noble Lord has also appointed Captain John Palmer to the lieutenant-colonelcy of the South Mayo, and Mr. Thomas H. Bourke, M.D., to the surgeoncy of the same regiment.

The depot of the 17th Regiment, which was under orders for the north of Ireland, is to remain for the present in Kilkenny, where recruiting for the regiment is said to be "extremely brisk." It is supposed that the 56th Regiment, now on passage home, will be stationed in Dublin on their arrival, instead of Kilkenny, as originally intended.

After the sailing of the 90th, under Lieut. Col. Eld, from Dublin, there remains only two regiments of infantry in Ireland, viz., 72nd at Limerick, and 1st Battalion, 91st at Cork. The 90th embark 1,000 strong in the Europe transport, from Dublin for the East.

A correspondent assures us that the 90th Regiment, which sailed from Kingstown last Sunday, were brought to embark with great difficulty; that a mutiny was apprehended, and that several privates were actually carried to the transport ship in custody. It is very surprising, indeed, that they should show any hesitation in sharing the "glorious triumphs of our arms in the East," of which one may read daily in the newspapers. "Dilly, dilly, come and be killed!"

**—Nation.** Captain Donovan, of the grenadier company of the 33rd regiment, who signally distinguished himself in the battle of the Alma, had captured one of the enemy's guns, and brought it with him as a trophy for his regiment, is a native of this county.—*Wexford Independent.*

A paragraph has been going the rounds of the press, detailing the heroic daring of a private of the 33rd, named Maguire. He was taken prisoner at the battle of Balaklava by three Russians and effected his escape, having overpowered his captors. Daniel Maguire was a native of Kiltiney, in this county; and was an inmate of the Roscommon workhouse, some time back, from whence he enlisted, with a detachment of the 33rd regiment, when stationed in this town. The inmate of the workhouse is now the hero of Balaklava!—*Roscommon Messenger.*

Little interest, apart from mere curiosity, as Ireland cares to manifest in the causes, progress, and results of the present war, she is now experiencing in full its material benefits, in enhancing the prices of her staple articles of production. And, probably on that account, so long as it lasts, the war will be popular with the Irish farmers, pretty much for the same reason that it is so with the same class in England—because it puts money in their purses. More than that, and rightly, because it repairs the injuries inflicted by a legislative measure which, however just and politic in the abstract, inflicted a deadly wound on the interests which had for thirty years enjoyed, on what used to be thought reasonable grounds, the benefits of the protective system. And though the advent of famine in Ireland were the pretext for that sudden alteration in the law, none paid so bitter a penalty as the people whose welfare, indeed whose very existence, the author of the measure professed to have most at heart. Irish agriculture was ruined, at the moment when it required every encouragement to sustain its fading energies. The landlords were ruined, too, though not half so extensively as they deserved, and as would have been beneficial to the country. But now all is changed. The sufferings of the past seem like an uneasy dream. New ease and animation pervade the country, and it only wants now political honesty and united action to be as formidable to its foes as ever it was. The Irish farmer exports a harvest and prices for it, such as were the days of Bonaparte, so fondly remembered still by many a fireside, have not been known in this unhappy Isle. Double crops and double prices are far from uncommon.—*Nation.*