

runs quite at the foot of Gravel pit Spur. From the edge of the plateau, so retired that their muzzles could scarcely be seen from below, Grant's batteries were pounding away, and their radiating fire must have made it very unpleasant for the enemy, as he could not get a gun to cover his advance and reduce the intensity of their rain of shell. But the enemy were advancing, and went tenaciously to work from the hedge rows, and roadsides and gardens, and took their pounding bravely. They could, indeed, make little or no impression on a force which was so well covered, and yet I could see into them and their ways with something like impunity. Then it became plain that Grant had only made a feint of holding the Hog's Back, and that he had prepared this position to catch the enemy gaily advancing after his retiring advance-guard, and much embarrassed to get out of the moshes of a close country and narrow roads. It was 11.30 when Staveley came on as if he meant to take no denial, but again and again his advance was checked, for he could not deploy, and the narrow front on the road was exposed to a hail of musketry, and every gap in the trees was swept by shell, and every route laid under the surveillance of an iron eye. The fight over towards Hungry Hill had quite ceased, and possibly the signalmen, had told Grant that Carey had occupied and was menacing his line of retreat on his right flank, so he applied himself to defend his position to the last. He had need to do so, for while he had been occupying the Hog's Back to make a show to deceive the enemy, and had been preparing to give him a warm reception on emerging from Ash and Trougham, the 2nd Division of the enemy's Army had been doing its work on the distant right. Somewhere about eleven o'clock Smith's Brigade proceeded to attack Hungry Hill (where the defending force was entrenched) on its left face, and one of the Field Batteries making a *detour* by the left gained an elevated spur west of Hungry Hill and opened fire upon it from a commanding position, which, perhaps, the paucity of the force at Sir Hope Grant's disposal did not permit him to occupy. The possession of this eminence by the enemy placed the defending force at a great disadvantage, and subjected them to a plunging fire, but still they might have stuck somewhat longer to their entrenched position. This movement was supported by the sub-brigade, which had advanced to the parallel roads. Maxwell's brigade, as soon as Smith was engaged, pushed forward from under cover at the Bishops, throwing out clouds of skirmishers, and moved against the right face of Hungry Hill. Menaced on the front and flank, and pounded by the Field Artillery, the defenders of Hungry Hill gave way, and began to retire just as the Prince of Wales's Cavalry moving across the Long Valley and wheeling to the right were ready to pounce upon them and cut off their retreat. The Prince had orders not to go to the left of Beacon Hill, and had therefore in the first instance to take a narrow road, lined with woods, which was held by the enemy's pickets, and thus was for a time barred to them. Their difficulties were increased by the defending force here not having seen or obeyed the orders to wear green leaves in their head dress, and it was owing to this that Captain Bulkeley was made prisoner. After a time the infantry, checking the cavalry advance, seemed to be retired, probably in consequence of the evacuation of Hungry Hill; and the Prince, in execution of his orders, led his brigade round by the left. His Horse Artillery had already enfiladed a position

occupied by the defenders of the camp towards the canal, and had again unlimbered and opened fire on the retreating forces, and the cavalry had destroyed two brigades, leaving Grant's force in the valley, only the pontoon bridge to escape by, when General Caroy received orders to go no further than Cove Common, and the action was over for the day.

The transport has the credit of having delayed the progress of the baggage dreadfully. The Artillery, Transport, and Army Service horses, are in the main good serviceable animals, and stand their work fairly, but many of the hired horses are declared to be useless beasts, and are already at the end of eight days nearly used up.

Many of the Volunteers left the force to-day, but large numbers have arrived to take their places. The correspondent of the *Standard* says: "The Volunteers have certainly done very well, and have shown the greatest vigilance on picket, ruthlessly making prisoners of all persons unprovided with parole. We have, however, heard complaints, that sufficient instruction was not afforded to them when ordered to take up a line of outposts. Surely the Staff are here to blame, for Brighton and Wimbledon field days do not impart a knowledge of that important duty. We hope that the Volunteers are only like other soldiers, fond of a grumble; but to judge by the language of some of them a week's campaigning extinguished many a man's martial ardour. What seemed to disgust them was the marching, and many of them declare that they will not take part in autumn manoeuvres again. Like most unaccustomed to lengthened pedestrian excursions they are very apt to exaggerate distances, and some of those belonging to the 2nd Division declared that on Friday they had marched twenty-one miles. Eight miles would have been nearer the mark, and we are certain that at the most the march was not more than ten miles."

The general result of the operations of Sir Charles Staveley's division on the right was that Grant's or the defending army, was compelled to fall back along the whole line, the invading force encamping on Saturday night pretty nearly in the same position from which Grant's army had advanced to defend the Hog's Back in the morning, while the latter withdrew towards Chobham Ridges and encamped in the neighborhood of Pirbright. On returning to town about nine o'clock the light of an extensive camp were visible on the Common "of that ilk." While the 3rd Division under Staveley, was thus victorious, Carey, with the 2nd Division directed his march to the north west of Farnham, crossing the South-Western Railway about Wracklesham, and passing *via* the Old Park towards Beacon Hill and the Long Valley—thus completely turning and rendering untenable the position taken up by Sir Hope Grant on the Hog's Back. The Prince of Wales's Light Brigade of Cavalry covered the advance in a dashing, masterly style, supported by the B. B. troop of Horse Artillery whose soldierlike appearance, remarkable activity, and thorough knowledge of their business, evinced in every moment, proclaimed them the *beau idéal* of gunners. Their horses were in splendid condition, and had hardly turned a hair, notwithstanding their long march, and some swiftly executed changes of position, and as they marched on to Cove Common about three o'clock they seemed perfectly ready for anything. The first, or Maxwell's brigade was on the extreme left, and swept round by Beacon Hill, Stevenson's or the second brigade being on the right, marching towards the Long Valley. As the writer approached from Farnham,

heavy firing was heard in that direction and he subsequently learnt that the depots which had been left behind at Aldershot were hotly engaged there in protecting Gen. Grant's right flank. They were quickly outnumbered, outflanked, and compelled to retire; but they fell back steadily, making the most of their ground, and keeping up a stout resistance until they were driven back into the station. The advance of the Light Cavalry brigade and Horse Artillery, sweeping round still further to the left from Beacon Hill, was a very pretty sight, whilst the infantry in their right rear, marching in columns of companies at wheeling distance, imparted an air of massiveness and strength to this part of the force. As it approached Beacon Hill, crossing the road to Odiham, the division had its left thrown forward, but after the defeat of the enemy it took ground to its right, the second brigade filing on to the Common first, followed by the Cavalry and artillery, Maxwell's brigade coming last. While the troops were streaming over the plain to take up the ground for their encampment, the scene, as viewed from the permanent camp of the 15th Regiment, assumed a very animated and picturesque character. The 10th Hussars and 12th Lancers, the latter with their pennions gaily floating in the breeze, circled round from the lines of march and formed columns of troops on ground most judiciously chosen for the purpose, their horses being picketed in a very short time, quietly enjoying their fodder. The 7th Dragoon Guards formed to the left rear of the other two corps, while the infantry regiments, to the sound of their bands were taking up their positions to the right and left, though somewhat in advance of the horsemen, the artillery being on both flanks of the battery. The Militia regiments, and more especially the King's Tower Hamlets, belonging to the 2nd Brigade, swung along at a capital rate, and seemed none the worse for their twelve miles' march.

The following pithy bit of criticism on the day's proceedings comes from the correspondent of the *Daily News*:—"On the whole (he says) the manoeuvres of yesterday (Saturday) have not made it apparent that we possess a commander capable of manipulating, with the electricity and unification which alone in large operations will command success, masses of troops whose aim it is to act simultaneously on an extended frontage, and on whose doing so is made to turn the success of the day. In a letter last week I quoted the opinion of a distinguished foreign critic to the effect that we were admirable in details, but that we broke down when we essayed manoeuvres on anything like an extended scale. Nothing can be advanced against the plan of the attack; but it so happened, in putting the plan in practice, that none of the subtle conjunctions and combinations deftly dovetailed. The wards of the lock in places worked rustily. In one important part they did not work at all. At Gravelotto eight army corps, each 50,000 strong, were swung round on a single pivot upon the French front extending from Point du Jour to Ste. Marie-aux-Chênes, and the French left flank was turned just at the critical moment when its whole front was engaged up to the hilt. In essentials the theory of yesterday's attacking work roughly resembled that celebrated movement, but the flanking movements were fragmentary, and had but a partial success, while Brownrigg, owing to the enemy's laxness, succeeded on the right, where, owing to the stubbornness of the enemy opposed to him Von Zastrow failed."

SUNDAY, SEPTEMBER 17TH.

To-day the troops rested on their arms.