

mean by it only the object
character or relation as
it is only two methods of
referring to the exciting or

instance, on one person en-
tance to commit suicide,
it is the subjective sense
the motive of their friend's
ady." This would not be
of character or relation
ance to shoot himself in
It was "that his death
character or relation that
ar of pain."

that is the true motive; for
the feeling of resolution or

ives, and also explain the
ives sustain to the true

ght to be applied is this:

real cause, yet, if there
use to rouse the subjec-
object of gratifying char-
of the subjective feeling,
ould be no distinct pres-
They are all, then, in a
and secondly, the two
e, the subjective motive
tion or consent acts on
set of the will. It is
one another, and also to
ions and the subjective

which is the true motive,
en, second, there is the
istinguish as the Objec-
ards which properly the
scent, for its appropri-
character or relation,
ative feeling—in other
action.

and these pages carefully,
are often one and the
as excites a subjective

or (gratificatory) and
proper, is observable in
ry of these objective
at any moment really
in himself, so that he

ding. The Ego in the
rounces the subjective
Ego, then under the
or relation, which the
which he looks at the
a subjective feeling,
looks at the gratify-

need in the sense of

ing object, he perceives the enswathing sentiment of his own mind as a subjective feeling, with tension pressing forcibly towards the object in the character or relation in which he is looking at it.

It follows, then, that though we may perceive, or be sensible of the subjective feeling in a state of tension when we look at the objective excitant, it is only when we look at the objective gratificatory that we are able to perceive, and feel, or estimate fully, the force or tension of the subjective feeling towards its natural outlet, namely, the objective gratificatory motive. We indeed call this motive the objective motive proper, because it is only at the moment when we look at it that the resolution or consent stands consciously between the subjective impulse and its gratification, and the Ego is able fully to feel the strength of the stream towards it.

It will then be apparent from the foregoing that in every process of the will in which subjective resolution or consent has to be aroused to perform a subjective act, these objective or outside motives perform a very important service in connection with the subjective motive proper—in other words, the subjective feeling.

(1) As the subjective feeling or impulse is really the true motive, or, at least, the one which acts directly on the Ego and excites the subjective resolution or consent, it will be apparent from what has been said, that in order to be able to feel or estimate its force at any moment on the subjective resolution, we must look at the objective motive proper—that is, at the object of gratifying character or relation.

(2) But if the subjective feeling or impulse should not happen to be in a state of activity, we may first require to rouse it by looking at the motive excitant—that is, at the object of exciting character or relation; then by the use of the objective motive proper, we shall be able to estimate accurately the amount of gratification arising from the indulgence of that subjective feeling.

In all those cases, however, in which the exciting and the gratifying relations are one and the same, the perception or thinking of the same objective motive answers both the purpose of exciting as well as of estimating the strength of the subjective motive.

While discussing the subjective feelings of the conscience, heart, etc.—in other words, subjective motives—in the earlier pages of this work, we very fully referred to and illustrated the exciting and gratifying relations existing between them and objective motives or concep- tions.

The subjective resolutions of the will, comprehending resolution or consent, non-consent, and irresolution or indecision, are precisely subjective feelings or states of the Ego like them, only devoid of impulse. And we must now call attention to the fact that all these subjective feelings of the will, though devoid of impulse, sustain the same two kinds of relation, as the subjective motive or feeling itself sustains to its exciting or gratifying objective motive or conception. They have an exciting relation and also another relation exactly parallel to the gratificatory or pacificatory of other subjective feelings, which, for want of a better name, we call the resolving relation. We cannot call the latter relation either gratifying or pacificatory, because the feeling is devoid of impulse; it is purely resolving. The subjective feelings of the will, being of a different nature, cannot gratify or pacificate by an object of particular character or relations, but they can resolve or consent to an object of particular character or relations. In other words, these subjective feelings of the will must always have something of particular character or relations to excite them; and when they are in a state of activity there must always be something of particular character or relations which they resolve; resolving or resolution in the case of these feelings, from the difference in their nature, takes the place of gratification or pacification.

All subjective feelings of the will, therefore, have their two relations exactly like other subjective feelings—(1) their exciting relation; (2) their resolving relation.

In the relation of excitement, a subjective feeling of the will sustains the same relation to the exciting subjective motive or feeling acting on it at the moment through the medium of an objective conception or motive, as the subjective motive or feeling itself sustains to its exciting conception or motive; and in the relation of resolving, a subjective feeling of the will sustains the same relation to the subjective energy in carrying into effect the gratification of the subjective motive through the medium of the objective conception or motive (conceived of at the moment), as the subjective motive or feeling itself in its gratifying relation (through the medium of the gratificatory conception or motive) sustains to the subjective resolution.

The subjective feelings, or states of non-consent and irresolution, which, along with resolution or consent, make up the subjective feelings of the will, all alike possess their relations of excitation and resolving, although they represent different states of mind; thus, the resolve of non-consent towards its correspondent subjective act, is one of non-consent; and that of irresolution is irresolution, in other words, indecision.

However, as the subjective feeling of resolution or consent is the one which is always