

preted as a political bonus for the United States by enhancing the palatability of the White Paper decision to begin dispersal negotiations. That is, the Canadian public and media were preoccupied with the retirement of the *Bomarc*s rather than with the dispersal negotiations.

In spite of what the White Paper does or does not say, three interrelated shifts of emphasis concerning the Canadian Armed Forces seem — to this observer — to be taking place: (1) in terms of budgetary priorities, defence programs will remain relatively frozen and thus assume a declining percentage of the GNP, while civilian programs will increase; (2) those activities that either conflict with or do not contribute to domestic requirements will be in jeopardy; (3) those roles that the Canadian military does assume will be multiple, with duties, training, equipment and organizational structure aimed at a number of "nation-building" functions.

These shifts of emphasis seem to reflect the underlying assumption that the primary threat to Canada is domestic. The corollary of this assumption is that Canada's relevance in joint defence is not only small but growing smaller, given the stabilization of the international system and technological developments in weaponry. This Canadian emphasis on the domestic picture focuses on possible terrorism in Quebec and on questions of Arctic sovereignty, but goes well beyond that to include all the economic and political problems of a nation of the size and complexity of Canada.

Hence, the three shifts in emphasis regarding civilian programs, complementary domestic-military activities, and multiple roles for the military. Indeed, this assumption of a domestic threat to Canada could be the genesis of the proposition that the greatest contribution Canada can make to Western collective security is to address itself to the domestic scene in Canada. Few U.S. officials would argue with the proposition that the disintegration of Canada would be a major strategic liability for the United States. Parenthetically, it might be noted that, not too long ago, a Canadian Prime Minister was declaring that Canada's first duty to the British Empire was not to disturb the English-French balance in Canada.

### Nixon Doctrine

The Nixon Doctrine, first articulated at Guam in 1969, constitutes a response to "the growing imbalance between the scope of America's role and the potential of America's partners". To further quote from President Nixon's February 1971 *Re-*

*port to the Congress*: "In other countries there was growing strength and autonomy. In our own, there was nascent isolationism in reaction to over-extension." Essentially, the Nixon Doctrine reflects the twofold assumption that a major U.S. international role remains indispensable, but that other nations can and should assume greater international responsibilities. The Nixon Doctrine, therefore, theoretically constitutes an unprecedented post-Second World War response to the demands of the U.S. domestic scene. Thus, both the United States and Canada are embarked on a conceptual course in the 1970s of according increasing priority to domestic factors, notwithstanding changes in administrations. Indeed, the primary question in both countries is not will there be a return to the era of the 1950s and 1960s but will the trend toward domestic priorities culminate in a neo-isolationist era similar to that of the inter-war period.

The Nixon Doctrine, stated most simply, embraces the conception of "burden-sharing." That is, allies of the United States must materially help the United States as the major bearer of the burden of collective security. Although fashioned as a response to U.S. involvement in Vietnam, the Nixon Doctrine was always meant to include all the U.S. defence interactions, and in fact has been reiterated time and again by the Nixon Administration. However, the most succinct and forceful restatement of the position appeared in President Nixon's dramatic announcement of August 15, 1971, of his New Economic Policy. That announcement contained a sentence that was largely ignored in the acrimonious reaction to the U.S. surcharge: "Now that other nations are economically strong the time has come for them to bear their fair share of the burden of defending freedom around the world."

President Nixon's New Economic Policy reflects an increased emphasis on economic considerations. However, no one in the Nixon Administration is arguing that the U.S. strategic deterrence and alliance system should be given less emphasis. The result — to this observer — could be confusion, so far as alliances tend to become ineffective in an atmosphere of undue international economic disorientation (e.g., the surcharge). In fact, allies can become enemies given that the key U.S. trading partners are generally also the key U.S. allies.

Moreover, the idea of "burden-sharing" itself becomes confusing. Essentially, it reflects the fact that for several years the U.S. defence budget is unlikely to grow substantially. Indeed, it is likely to be reduced. But how acceptable is the notion of

*Result of emphasis on economic issues could produce alliance confusion*