

which to base negotiations. Admittedly Canada being further removed might take a more objective view of the situation. It was our desire to be helpful if we could. I reminded Rusk that last autumn we had been invited to play a mediatory role in company with Mexico and Brazil in an effort to bring USA and Cuba together.¹⁸ While recognizing that penetration of Sino-Soviet bloc into the Western hemisphere was of common concern to Canada, USA and Latin American states I emphasized that drastic action by USA in our view might serve only to force the Castro régime deeper into the Communist camp and jeopardize the possibilities of common action on an inter-American basis.

5. Rusk conceded that by the time the new Administration assumed office the situation had already gone very far and thus to a large extent the decisions taken had been forced upon them by circumstances. They had to deal with the situation as it existed. Rusk warned that "though decisions" would confront the Administration in the following eventualities: (a) if there were any more armed forays from Cuba against neighbouring states (there had been four in 1959-60); (b) if there were an attack on Guantánamo; (c) if Communist bloc missile bases were established in Cuba.

6. Elaborating on point (c), Rusk said that it was one thing for USA to be exposed to the possibility of ICBM attacks from Soviet territory; it was quite another to be exposed to attack by short range missiles. Such a prospect was intolerable to USA. While USA did not repeat not fear Castro they could not repeat not permit Khrushchev to shield behind him. The Administration was finding it difficult to hold the line against public and congressional pressures for direct action.

7. In conclusion I stressed that USA Government had taken the right decision in not repeat not intervening in Cuba with USA troops; that unilateral action by USA would create an entirely new situation. I hoped that USA would move as much as possible in step with other Latin American states. I also queried just what Rusk meant by "the liquidation of Sino-Soviet connection." Rusk defined this phrase as meaning the expulsion of some thousand Russian and Chinese technicians now in Cuba and the resumption by Cuba of its place in the Inter-American system. As to Latin American opinion, Rusk asserted that USA policy had the covert support of nearly all Latin American heads of government who are now firmly convinced that Castro should go. Because of local political pressures they were however in some cases unable to take a public position in support of USA.

8. Rusk solicited any assistance we could give in evacuating the remainder of USA citizens in Cuba. I said that we would see what we could do, explaining that our evacuation arrangements were coordinated with those of UK.

9. Rusk suggested and I agreed that we should keep in close touch on the Cuban situation.

10. In view of the implications of the important things Rusk had to say this message should be given limited circulation.¹⁹

[H.C.] GREEN

¹⁸ Voir/See Volume 27, documents 588-92, 594-98, 603, 607, 612.

¹⁹ Pour un compte rendu américain de la conversation entre Green et Rusk, voir *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1997), document 212. For an American record of Green's conversation with Rusk, see *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1997), document 212.