

necessarily the only basis of negotiation. It is important to hold the nuclear powers to their undertaking in this respect. Resumption of testing is not a valid reason for abandoning or relaxing the search for an effective solution to this problem; on the contrary it should serve to underline the necessity for a renewed effort on the part of nuclear and non-nuclear powers alike.

2. When making their representations Heads of Mission should hand Foreign Ministers a copy of the statement issued by the Prime Minister to the press today.<sup>22</sup> Text of this statement is contained in our immediately following telegram.

3. Please report reaction to your representations.

*For Disarmament Delegation Geneva:*

4. Please give copies of Prime Minister's statement to heads of eight-non-aligned and at the same time convey to them views expressed in this telegram.

34.

DEA/50271-M-40

*Note du conseiller scientifique de la délégation  
au Comité sur le désarmement  
pour le conseiller du Gouvernement canadien en matière du désarmement*

*Memorandum from Scientific Adviser to Delegation  
to Disarmament Committee  
to Advisor to Government of Canada on Disarmament*

RESTRICTED

May 3, 1962

BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING

*Proposal by Neutrals*

You asked me to examine this proposal and see whether any of the scientific facts indicated a line which Canada could take. I don't honestly believe that, within present Government policy, there is any proposal I can make.

2. We, and the neutrals, are in fact enmeshed in our own net: using Canada as an example, our Government has consistently stressed that it is against *all* tests. Recently the Prime Minister has stated publicly that any test ban without provision for adequate inspection would be one-sided and dangerous. Since the Canadian Government oppose underground testing, which cannot affect public health, their policy must therefore be based, not on the health hazard, but on discontinuing nuclear weapons development.

3. Logically, therefore, we should be pressing for a detection system which will expose all violations it is possible to detect (and this implies on-site inspection) and for a programme of research and development to make this system more and more sensitive. Instruments will only record what they will record, and no amount of talking round a table in Geneva will alter this. Nor does the fact that the Swedes have detected some underground explosions in USA mean that they can guarantee to detect every one.

<sup>22</sup> Voir William MacEachern, "P.M. Regrets Failure to Get Test Ban Pact," *Toronto Daily Star*, April 26, 1962, p. 1; pour lire le texte complet de cette déclaration, prière de consulter le télégramme N-204, du 25 avril 1962, † MAE/50271-M-40.

See William MacEachern, "P.M. Regrets Failure to Get Test Ban Pact," *Toronto Daily Star*, April 26, 1962, p. 1; for the full text of the statement, see telegram N-204, April 25, 1962, † DEA/50271-M-40.