

both. Neither of them can be accepted so long as consciousness testifies to the existence of these two independent factors, mind and matter. Does it not accord with your common sense that mind does most assuredly distinguish itself from its surroundings? When you walk through the city, and see our Mountain, so called, the magnificent houses that adorn its side, the Victoria Bridge, our churches and ware-houses, is it not impossible for you to confound these objective realities with yourself? No less clearly does the soul distinguish itself from the matter more closely related to it as its bodily organism. In fact, unless these two can be distinguished from each other, viz. the cognizing subject, and the object cognized, knowledge is impossible. But if I am asked to define specifically what is meant by the subject, or the substance called mind, I cannot answer better than in the words of one who has ably discussed this point. "It has being, it has power to act, and it has permanency, that is continues to exist independent of your thoughts concerning it. Both mind and matter possess these qualities. We may be able to say little about mind. We can say little concerning any thing that is simple. I know it exists by every act of self-consciousness. I know it has power,—it exercises it over other things, over its own thoughts and over the bodily frame. Moreover I know it has permanency; it is not a mere idea created by certain forces and passing away when I cease to think of it. But if the mind, like the body has these three qualities,—being, potency, permanency—it is a substance." This conclusion however depends on another step which we must now take in our argument, specially against Dr. Maudesley, viz. *that the veracity of consciousness cannot be impeached; and for this reason universal scepticism is impossible, it is self-destructive.*

In attempting to nullify our faith in consciousness Dr. Maudesley destroys the foundation of all his own arguments. If we grant him that for which he contends we can no longer give credit to any of his statements. If consciousness is not reliable, if "all men are liars," if the very root of our nature is a lie, how can we accept the testimony of the person who gives us this unwelcome information? Plainly, according to the doctrine advanced, we can have no confidence in our senses,—the trustworthiness of these must fall along with the veracity of consciousness,—and yet do not the very persons whose views we are combating constantly assume that their senses are reliable, if not infallible, while employed in conducting the manipulations of physical science?

But here is another grave error in the reasoning of this author in this connection, and one which seems to have escaped the notice of his severest critics. It is an error into which many have fallen, and which has led to no small confusion and controversy in philosophy. *It consists in confounding consciousness with a process of discursive thought; or in attributing to consciousness what in no sense or manner belongs to it.* Take the example referred to by Dr. Maudesley. "A man suffering from vertigo supposes that the world turns round." Grant that this is the testimony of a person thus afflicted. This is not a deliverance of consciousness pure and simple, this is a conclusion arrived at inferentially, and its validity or non-validity has nothing to do with the question in hand. Because the sick man's logic is at fault, it surely does not necessarily follow that his consciousness is mendacious. And so in many other cases referred to.—Both sane men and lunatics may be utterly wrong in their logical processes, but in spite of these failures I cling to the old doctrine