

*Supply—National Defence*

100 per cent in what the minister has said, namely that we cannot do these things alone; that defence is indeed collective and that there has to be a partnership. But my quarrel with his concept of collective defence—and I shall have a good deal to say about this later—is that we are in danger of replacing the Atlantic concept of collective defence by the North American concept of fortress America.

Discussion of these matters is for us all in Canada the more important because of our collective responsibilities under NATO and, indeed, because of our essential and necessary relationship—and it is a special relationship and must by the facts of geography and economics remain a special relationship—with the United States in continental defence. That relationship has existed for about 20 years, but it has now reached, I believe, the point of almost complete integration.

Well, now, what have we had from the government in the last two years in this house to show its appreciation of these developments? I suggest, Mr. Chairman, that we have had very little. Indeed, in this present session we have had a special discussion of one aspect of defence only, made necessary by the cancellation of the CF-105. Up to the present that is all. That is in startling and depressing contrast with the United States where certainly a great debate has been going on.

The committee will recall that more than once this session and last session, inside the house and outside the house, we on this side have argued for the examination of this problem before a committee. We have not been successful in achieving that end, and as a result we have had to get a great many of our facts and the information on which to base our statements and our views from the United States, where they are really much concerned with what has happened and with what should be done about it, and where they are, as I have said, discussing it at great length in congress. A similar situation prevails in London. Here when we have asked questions in the House of Commons, very often prompted by reports in the press on defence policies and defence statements in Washington that have a very important bearing on our own policy, very often when we have asked those questions the minister's reaction has not been, shall I say, very appreciative of our interest, and some of our questions it seems to me he has not taken very seriously. I quote from the Ottawa correspondent of the *Globe and Mail* of June 13, who said:

The Canadian defence muddle which has developed largely as a result of Defence Minister

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Pearkes' olympian refusal to state clearly what the problem is and what is the government's approach—

Then, Mr. Chairman, came the white paper about which the minister spoke a short time ago, from which we expected a serious analysis of some of the problems I have mentioned. We did not get it, I suggest to the minister, in that report. Canada defence policy, in the nuclear world of missiles and outer space, is not found in this white paper which, in its substance and form, follows pretty much the papers of previous years from the Department of National Defence. It does not take sufficiently into consideration the changes that have been taking place.

The minister, however, has stated—he certainly did not do so this morning, when I think he took a far more realistic view of the threat—and this is certainly not to be accepted in lieu of a defence policy, that the west “can knock the stuffing out of the aggressor”. That kind of statement, Mr. Chairman, seems to me to be on a par with one that was made some months ago, as reported in the press, by an unnamed general in the Pentagon that “nuclear war will mean universal destruction but I am sure we can win it.” I feel that statements and observations of that kind are no substitute for policy. Canada is now in what has been called the classic but uncomfortable position of the buffer state. Let us not become a bluffer state as well.

What, Mr. Chairman, will the aggressor be doing when we are knocking the stuffing out of him? Well, the minister gave us some pretty sobering observations on that point this morning, and I am able to quote them because he was courteous enough to let me have an advance copy of his statement just before he made it. He said:

In the early 1960's it is expected that ballistic missiles will have reached a stage of reliability whereby such missiles will replace the bomber as the primary means of delivering nuclear weapons on North America.

This is the early 1960's.

However, if an attack on this continent is made in the early 1960's it is considered quite probable that a variety of weapons would be used in an effort to saturate the defences and, thus, deliver a devastating initial attack.

This is the aggressor whose stuffing we can knock out, and while we are doing that he is going to deliver a devastating initial nuclear attack on us. The statement goes on:

This kind of an attack would include ballistic missiles, both long and short range, land-based and from submarines, as well as other nuclear weapons delivered by aircraft. As most of the major strategic targets are situated in the United

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