

disarmament. The control of armaments and their reduction is what I wish to concentrate on in these remarks, but not before I touch on the third element of security, that of the peaceful settlement of disputes. This is an area which, like arms control and disarmament, has not evolved in sophistication to the same degree as the technology of armaments. The use of the U.N. to settle disputes, the International Court of Justice, the process of arbitration or mediation by these bodies or other third parties; these means are used but not to the degree they should be. In addition, it is an important plank of Canadian foreign policy that the international community must address the economic and ideological differences which are often underlying causes of international disputes.

Although there is not sufficient time to review the full range of Canadian policies and activities in arms control and disarmament, I should like to highlight the main elements. The first is our belief that there is no substitute for the painstaking negotiation of verifiable agreements by those parties at risk of conflict. I do not believe that unilateral disarmament is a viable option. Experience has shown that it is difficult to conduct meaningful negotiations when an imbalance in forces exists. A state or an alliance which perceives itself to be in an inferior position has no interest in limitations that would codify its inferiority. A nation or an alliance which sees itself to be in a superior position has no incentive to limit its own forces in exchange for limitations of those on the other side, unless that side has clearly shown the capacity and resolve to restore the balance.

I said that agreements must be verifiable. Verification is not a tactic to prevent success in negotiations; more than ever before, it is a prerequisite for their success. Each party to the agreement must have confidence that the other party or parties are abiding by its terms. Canada does not insist on absolute verifiability, which in most cases is unobtainable. Each state must be prepared to take certain risks in the interest of progress in controlling the level and sophistication of armaments. But if an agreement is not considered to be adequately verifiable,