

appropriate safeguards, and through a UN agency, to all countries declared by international experts able to benefit, Canada is opposed to any peaceful nuclear explosions not conducted in accordance with the provisions of the NPT. In doing so, we are not imputing motives; we are attempting to avoid the subjunctive.

These are the reasons why Canada signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, why we voiced such criticism of the Indian test, why I seize every opportunity to garner the support of world leaders for a tightening and an extension of safeguards and controls. These are the reasons why we shall continue to do so.

Each one of us shares a common desire -- to turn over to our children a world safer than the one we inhabit, a world not subject to nuclear blackmail or coercion, a world not frightened by insidious terrorist acts and not threatened by imbalances in the equilibrium of nature. Nor is this the only desire we share. There is, I know, still another -- that in years to come we shall be able to face our children and assure them that we did not lack the courage to face these difficult questions, did not lack the stamina to pursue the correct solutions.

In the past several months, I have argued the importance of a strengthened safeguards regime with some 40 heads of government -- around a conference table, as at the Commonwealth meeting in Jamaica, and across a desk, as with each of the nine leaders I have visited in Europe and the several that have come to Ottawa. The Secretary of State for External Affairs addressed the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in Geneva last month -- and was the only foreign minister to do so. Senior government officials have travelled tens of thousands of miles in an effort to tighten existing safeguards and to broaden both the scope of their impact and the breadth of their application by supplier countries. We have raised the standard of our safeguards -- with full support for the International Atomic Energy Agency, which administers them -- to the point that they are the toughest in the world (and we are constantly on the alert for ways to make them more practical, more effective). We impose, as well, still another constraint -- we refuse to engage in nuclear co-operation without an explicit exclusion of explosive uses.

I do not pretend that the present international regime for the inspection and detection of nuclear cheating is foolproof. I am painfully aware that the NPT is yet far from universally supported. I am deeply conscious of the responsibilities that devolve on Canada as a world leader in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. But to those who contend that there is an incompatibility between these two obligations I have mentioned - assisting the less-developed countries and preventing nuclear proliferation --, I remind them that