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But, as we have come to realize in the course of our studies in the CCD, the problem of devising an effective system of verification is proving to be extremely difficult -- if not intractable. Facilities for development and production of chemical-warfare agents are not essentially different from those required for many industrial chemical processes -- indeed, some industrial chemicals can be used as chemical-warfare agents. Chemical weapons in many cases do not differ in external appearance from other munitions. Clearly, in these circumstances, adequate verification would be difficult and would seem to need some kind of internationally-supervised system of "on-site" inspection. But such a system is anathema to certain governments. Even if this problem did not exist, it is evident that, by the nature of the task to be carried out, adequate verification will require a system that is intrusive and expensive, and will be difficult to reconcile with the requirement that it should not hinder unduly the operations of chemical industries throughout the world, or constitute an undue burden on the international community.

From this, it is evident that the question of the adequacy of verification will seem by many states to be related directly to the scope of a prohibition. Unless the system of verification is found adequate, those states now having the protection of a deterrent chemical-weapons capacity may be unwilling to accept a scope of prohibition that would include their existing chemical-weapons capacity. On the other hand, states which do not have independent access to a chemical-weapons deterrent capacity may be unwilling to adhere to a treaty placing restraints on themselves without there being at least some reduction in potential chemical warfare threats they fear.

Then there is another problem that has not been faced up to by any of the proposals submitted so far to the CCD. Is the treaty only to come into effect if all members of the UN adhere to it, or do we have to envisage a situation whereby a nation would be expected to forswear its right to chemical weapons even if its potential enemies did not do likewise? What provisions, if any, should be put into the treaty to deal with this situation? These are hard questions, but they must be answered if there is to be any hope of negotiating an effective treaty.

It will be evident from what I have said that my delegation does not see any instant solutions to this difficult set of problems. We believe that the CCD should proceed with all deliberate speed in its search for the elements of a treaty, and to this end it should continue its meticulous examination of the complex issues involved.

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