

It is, I think, relevant to point out, however, that all these views were not motivated by anything like identical considerations and purposes. Each party had its own particular reasons for wishing to have us stay on but few, if any, of them had common motives among themselves or shared those of the Canadian Government. Some, I think, would like to have seen an effective International Commission, but for others it was sufficient for their purposes that a commission of some sort should exist. Their reasons were more in the realm of psychology and local considerations than arising out of a conviction that the ICCS as constituted could in fact ensure the carrying out of the terms of the Agreement.

For reasons that are easy to understand, governments of countries that are not directly involved in Viet-Nam present more general but familiar arguments to the effect that any international presence is better than no international presence, and that even though there is no guarantee the Commission will ever do anything useful, Canada should nevertheless continue to serve against the possibility that it might be able to do something at some future time. This is not our own assessment of the Commission's *raison d'être* nor necessarily the assessment of those who advance the argument, but it illustrates a danger present in taking on assignments such as this. The job tends to create its own justification. For our part, after nineteen years experience in Viet-Nam we are not greatly impressed by this sort of argument.