

and light weapons to the Register. In general no changes were made to the Register categories for major political reasons (that is, for every change that some agreed to, others disagreed). But the 1994 review did address the role of anti-personnel landmines: "The Group recognized the terrible suffering, injuries and deaths caused by the misuse of antipersonnel mines, but felt that the Register was not the appropriate mechanism to deal with this problem".⁴³

Arguments for inclusion in the Register

There are some good reasons for the Register to expand to include this class of weapon.

- There are cases of states exporting this class of weapon in large quantities to regions of tension and conflict, the exact type of situation for which the Register was created.

- Furthermore, a significant percentage of the trafficking in these weapons is illicit. One of the first steps in tackling illicit trade is to make the legitimate trade transparent.

- There is increasing evidence that better monitoring of the flow and visibility of these weapons is possible and that such data could be used to provide early warning to those in a position to prevent or ameliorate armed conflict using these weapons.⁴⁴

- Given the systemic shift in the nature of conflict currently dominating the international system, movement in the direction of making the trade in weapons actually being used to kill people in armed conflict more transparent would add legitimacy to the Register. Those States not participating because the Register is irrelevant to their security situation would be more likely to participate.

Arguments against inclusion in the Register⁴⁵

- This class of weapon is inherently more difficult for States to monitor. In the early days one way that the Register gained credibility was to match its data with the public data of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). As it turned out the Register

⁴³ . United Nations General Assembly. *Report on the Continuing Operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and Its Further Development*. A/49/316, 22 September 1994.

⁴⁴ . For two treatments of the potential for using small arms and light weapons in early warning, see: Edward J. Laurance, *Light Weapons and Intra-state Conflict: Early Warning Factors and Preventive Action*. (Washington: The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, July 1998). www.ccpdc.org; and Edward J. Laurance (Editor), *Arms Watching: Integrating Small Arms and Light Weapons Into the Early Warning of Violent Conflict*. (London: International Alert, May 2000).

⁴⁵ . For an early treatment of these arguments see Edward J. Laurance, "Addressing the Negative Consequences of Light Weapons Trafficking: Opportunities for Transparency and Restraint." In Jeffrey Boutwell et. al. (Editors), *Lethal Commerce: The Global Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons*. (Cambridge: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1995), pp. 140-157.