

to the Committee are based on a careful consideration of the report as a whole, and the important discussion which has taken place in this Committee.

The Canadian Delegation agrees in principle with the eleven recommendations of the Committee which were unanimously approved and with the twelfth which was approved by a substantial majority. In particular, in our view, the Special Committee established beyond doubt the need to end as soon as practicable the mandate for Palestine, to grant independence in Palestine and to clear out rapidly by concerted international action the Assembly centres for displaced persons in Europe so as to relieve distress and create a better climate in which to carry out a final solution of the Palestine problem.

The discussion which has taken place in this Committee has, in our view, tended to confirm the principal argument given by a majority of the Committee in support of its proposal for partition with economic union. The report says:

"The basic premise underlying the partition proposal is that the claims to Palestine of the Arabs and Jews, both possessing validity, are irreconcilable, and that among all of the solutions advanced, partition will provide the most realistic and practicable settlement, and is the most likely to afford a workable basis for meeting in part the claims and national aspirations of both parties."

In the debate to which we have listened, strong arguments have been advanced in support of both Zionist and Arab positions, of the basis of geographical, historical, legal, social, ethnological and other considerations. These arguments lead in opposite directions rather than pointing the way to a mutually satisfactory adjustment.

There has been much discussion of the principle of self-determination and of the areas and groups to which this principle should apply, much debate on the character, the interpretation and the priority of commitments. While these considerations are of great importance and none of them can be ignored, we have come to the conclusion that the most important question for our consideration is what arrangement will best enable two peoples living within the confines of a restricted geographical area to avoid obstructing one another's development and most conduce to their welfare and freedom.

ACCEPT SOMEWHAT RELUCTANTLY

Our own experience predisposes us in favour of national unity in some form. In Canada we have had to work out a problem which while not analogous has points of resemblance to that which confronts the Committee for we ourselves are a nation of two peoples with two cultural traditions. During almost two centuries, both before and after the attainment of self-government in Canada, a number of solutions have been tried, including both partition and com-

plete union. Eventually we reached a satisfactory working arrangement in a federal state which is now 80 years old. Every year which passes confirms the wisdom of the decision we made and strengthens the interdependence and the mutual respect which made it possible. Confederation in Canada, was, however, based on agreement. The representative of Pakistan has said here that partition should not take place without consent but the question arises as to whether it is any better to try to maintain unity without consent. There is no evidence yet in anything we have seen or heard that both Arabs and Jews will accept accommodation within the framework of a single state. We maintain the hope, based on our own experience in federation, that they will some day find in federation a means of solving their problems. For the moment, however, we must accept the fact that they have emphatically rejected even the form of federation suggested in the minority report. In the circumstances we have been lead to accept, somewhat reluctantly, the majority proposals for partition as a basis for discussion.

Since the report of the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine was written, the problem has been greatly altered by the announcement by the mandatory power of its intention to withdraw from Palestine. This is a statement of serious import and we must take it into full account in making our decisions.

THREE URGENT PROBLEMS

Confronted with the situation which will arise when the mandatory power withdraws, we must, I think, consider urgently three problems.

First, how can we work out quickly and efficiently the details of the plan for Palestine which we are preparing to adopt?

Secondly, who will take over the responsibility for the administration of Palestine which the mandatory power proposes to surrender?

Thirdly, how shall we go about putting our decisions into effect in the absence of agreement by both Jews and Arabs to accept them?

In regard to the first of these questions, we share the views of other delegations that the partition scheme must be made workable if either political pacification or economic unity is to be achieved in Palestine. Therefore a sub-Committee should be set up without delay, as the United States Delegation has suggested, to work out the details of a scheme particularly in respect of boundaries for recommendation to the Committee and, if approved, the Assembly.

There remains to be considered the other two questions: the acceptance of responsibility for administration and the problem of implementation. Various suggestions have been put forward in the course of discussions in this Committee as regards possible measures for giving effect to a settlement in Palestine. In particular, we note that the United States has expressed its willingness to participate in a

United Nations programme for meeting economic and financial problems and the problem of internal law and order during the transition period. For the purpose of meeting the problem in internal law and order the United States Delegation has suggested the establishment of a special constabulary recruited on a voluntary basis by the United Nations.

SUGGESTION OF SPECIAL CONSTABULARY

From a preliminary examination of this proposal, we believe that such a scheme has possibilities which must certainly be explored. It should be recognized, however, that the authority of the United Nations over such a force must be established beyond doubt, while the basis of recruitment should be such that it will not further inflame either community in Palestine. To establish United Nations authority it may be necessary to explore the possible application of Chapter 12 of the Charter during the period of transition to independence.

The Security Council has also been mentioned as an appropriate organ which might be charged with the responsibilities of implementation since the immediate question involved would be that of safe-guarding peace and security.

It is to be hoped, however, that in spite of the uncompromising words which have been used in this committee, the executive functions of the Security Council will not have to be invoked. We must assume that the decision we make will be a collective and responsible one. Once that decision has been reached, all members of the United Nations will realize that precipitate action to challenge it in violation of the Charter would set in train events of serious and unpredictable consequence not only to Palestine, but also to the United Nations itself.

The problems raised by these questions concerning administration after the withdrawal of the mandatory power and the implementation of whatever plan we adopt should in our view be the subject of special and separate study by a second sub-Committee in which the five permanent members of the Security Council should be included. This sub-Committee would take into consideration, among other things, the suggestions regarding methods of implementation which have been made in the course of this debate.

In conclusion, I must reiterate with emphasis the view I have already expressed that only through compromise and accommodation can the people of Palestine hope to find the freedom and the control of their destinies which they so rightly and urgently desire. The United Nations, for its part, will have to be prepared collectively to support the decisions reached during this Assembly. Only in this way will it be possible to provide the conditions of stability which are necessary if Arabs and Jews are to be enabled eventually to find peace and understanding within the arrangement which is made.

U.N. INFORMATION SERVICE: Senator Norman Lambert of the Canadian delegation told the United Nations budget Committee Oct. 15 that his government approves the U.N. information service work but does not want it to be merely "a shot in the dark".

The Committee was considering an item of \$3,280,000 for the public information branch and most delegates seemed to think it too much.

Senator Lambert said it was too much or too little according to the value the branch was giving and what use was being made of the information. At the moment the Committee did not know.

He proposed that the secretary general review annually the use being made throughout the world of the information material supplied.

"With such information available the Assembly will be able to assess more accurately the character and size of the information program required", he said.

"The Canadian delegation has been guided by the view that the success of the U.N. will depend not only on its practical achievements but also on the degree to which its purposes and performance are understood and supported by an informed public opinion in each member state."

QUESTION OF S.W. AFRICA: The Fourth (Trusteeship) Committee of the U.N. Assembly Oct. 15 adopted a resolution, submitted by the India delegation, urging South Africa to present a trusteeship agreement for South West Africa in time for its consideration during the third regular session of the General Assembly.

A revised Danish proposal would have urged the South African Government to present such an agreement "at an early date" and would request the U.N. Secretary-General to report to the third regular session of the Assembly the results of that recommendation. Poland offered a further amendment to have the Assembly declare that it is the clear intention of Chapter 11 of the Charter that all former mandated territories be placed under trusteeship. This was carried by 21 to 19.

A roll call vote was taken on the paragraph of the Indian resolution proposing a time-limit. It carried by 27 to 23 with one abstention. Russia and the Slav group voted with the majority. Canada, the U.K. and U.S. voted with the minority.

The Indian resolution as a whole was then carried by 27 to 20, with four abstentions.

(S.W. Africa is a former German colony for which the Union of South Africa was given a League mandate after the first Great War. South Africa has maintained that there is no legal obligation to yield the mandate and that the people of South West Africa do not want a trusteeship, preferring to become a part of the union.)