

well, such a division addresses one of the main concerns of most security forces -- they must be better armed than the illegal groups or individuals they deal with, criminal or political. Obviously such an approach does not prevent individual states from imposing what ever weapons or firearms restrictions their domestic constituency believes suitable for its own purposes.

## Supply

Much of the literature analyzes light weapons proliferation through the supply side spectrum of diffusion. According to Michael Klare, the diffusion as opposed to proliferation model expands the number of actors involved in supplying weapons and the numbers of actors engaged in acquiring weapons.<sup>17</sup> In a comprehensive analysis of supply sources for light weapons Klare compartmentalizes transfers into nine categories which consist of government grants, government sales or transfers, commercial sales, technology transfers, covert arms deliveries, government gifts to allied paramilitary groups, the black market, theft and exchanges between insurgent and criminal organizations.<sup>18</sup> These can be grouped roughly as follows.

**Government.** According to Klare government grants are transfers at little or no cost, on a state-to-state basis, and are now by and large relics of the Cold War. Government sales are transfers of surplus weapons or weapons from government owned factories. The potential impact of surplus weapons as a contributor to light weapons proliferation cannot be underestimated whether they are deemed to be government or commercial particularly in view of the number of weapons that are currently surplus.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>17</sup> See Michael T Klare "Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era." In *Light Weapons and International Security*. Nirankari Colony, Delhi: Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs, British American Security Information Council, Indian Pugwash Society, and Institute for Defence Studies and Analyzes, 1995, 3

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 8

<sup>19</sup> In 1996 a multi-national inspection team carried out a CFE Treaty inspection in Belarus. As permitted by the Treaty several large warehouse within a declared site were inspected to confirm their contents. In the first warehouse, the inspectors observed long, rectangular wooden crates stacked nine high, twelve deep, in sixty-eight rows. External markings indicated the presence of small arms, possibly 12 to 14 per crate. There were at least ten other warehouses filled in a similar fashion. Some crates were open and the presence of AK-47, AKM, AKS and Dragunov sniper rifles were confirmed. At least one hundred crates of Makarov semi-automatic pistols were also observed. It was estimated that there were probably over a quarter of a million firearms present. The stockpiled firearms are believed to be a legacy of the Soviet era, when second echelon Frontal soldiers would have paused to pick up their firearms on the way west to fight NATO troops. At present the firearms belong to the Belorussians, who have no use for them except as a saleable commodity. Rail and trucking facilities were in direct proximity to the warehouses. The local Belorussians, jokingly offered to sell or trade the firearms with members of the team. Source: Canadian inspector who was a team member and personally inspected the warehouses in question.